

THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICAL PERSUASION:
THREE CASE STUDIES EXPLORING “RHETORIC OF COERCION”

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ABSTRACT

Does specific rhetoric from leaders have a direct impact on influencing others? In their 2007 essay “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms”, Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson introduce a matrix which classifies the outcome of a political rhetorical campaign as either Policy Change, Mixed, Implications Contest, or Framing Contest. The matrix measures the rhetorical arguments of a Claimant (C) against the response of the Opposition (O), particularly when played out in front of the Public (P).

Using three distinct case studies, the applicability and utility of their matrix is tested against a number of different types of scenarios. Case Study 1 applies the matrix to President Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union Addresses where he attempts to bring the American public around to his new policy of “rollback”. Case Study 2 analyses the differences between protest rhetoric in 1988-89 Poland and 2011 Tunisia to determine if certain types of protest rhetoric are more persuasive than others. Finally the third Case Study applies the matrix to rhetoric between Georgia and Russia in the months leading up to the 2008 war, to determine if Georgia is able to successfully persuade Russia to change their policy when publically shamed.

Each Case Study produced a different result, however the real question is whether the Krebs-Jackson formula is a successful measure of C’s rhetoric when attempting to influence O. It was determined that while it can be difficult to pinpoint the correlation or causation between C’s rhetoric and O’s response, the formula is an exceptionally useful tool to organize and clarify obscure political rhetoric.

Read by: Dr. Dorothea Wolfson and Dr. Kathryn Wagner

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INTRODUCTION

Author Nathaniel Hawthorne once said of the power of speech: "Words – so innocent and powerless as they are, as standing in a dictionary, how potent for good and evil they become, in the hands of one who knows how to combine them!" No truer statement could be made about the power of political speech, where words are often all a political figure has to convince his or her constituency. Words can cause changes of heart, of mind, or of history, and politicians have long since learned how to wield the power of rhetoric to turn the tables in their favor.

It can be difficult, though, to measure the impact of those words against the outcome. For all the bravado displayed by political actors – whether grassroots groups or politicians themselves – is there enough in the rhetoric to cause genuine persuasion? Should political groups spend valuable time and resources manipulating their speeches and cherry-picking verbiage? Looking at the rhetoric alone is not enough to tell; the result is determined by whether or not the target audience (known in this essay as the Opposition) succumbs to the deeper intentions of the political actor (referred to as a Claimant). Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson introduced those terms in their 2007 article “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms”, and the matrix which resulted from their work is used as the foundation of the three case studies analyzed in this essay.

The case studies in this thesis explore the power of words over a particular audience and will use the Krebs-Jackson model in three different ways to measure the impact of that rhetoric. Chapter One presents a ‘Top-Down’ case study, rhetorical influence from the government to the people, in which public opinion is measured against the particular rhetoric chosen to describe the Soviet Union over time. The objective is to

determine whether or not the American people reacted favorably or unfavorably toward the Soviet Union based on how leadership chose to portray them, and the Krebs-Jackson formula serves as a tool to decipher the ups and downs in public opinion.

Chapter Two looks at rhetorical influence in the converse: from the people to the government, or ‘Bottom-Up’. The world has seen at least two instances of “pan-revolution” where grassroots protests in one country create a domino effect around the region: the 1989 Fall of Communism and the 2011 Arab Spring. Poland and Tunisia were the two nations to initiate their respective “pan-revolution”, and this case study applies the Krebs-Jackson matrix to the rhetoric used in each country to determine if certain types of rhetoric are more effective in protest settings.

And finally, the third case study in Chapter Three explores the use of rhetoric from one country to intimidate another country, ‘Peer-to-Peer’, examining the rhetoric flung back and forth between Georgia and Russia in the months leading up to the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008. In this case, Georgia goes head to head with its former Soviet controller in a rhetorical battle that plays out on the world stage. The success or failure of Georgia’s rhetorical battle is measured by the response from Moscow, and in a peripheral manner, the attentions of the Western world.

This essay ultimately seeks to answer two questions: first, was C successful in effecting policy change by persuading O through rhetoric? And second, is the Krebs-Jackson formula an appropriate metric by which to measure this success? Since each case study is quite distinct, the Krebs-Jackson formula can be seen in a wide variety of scenarios and with varying outcomes. This further proves the utility of the matrix, and

allows the readers to see how the tool can extract conclusions from each case study which would be otherwise murky, even when the case study itself appears straightforward.

PREVIOUS STUDIES IN POLITICAL RHETORIC

Political Persuasion

The idea of using particular rhetoric as an influential political tool is not a novel concept, yet very few scholarly works explore the notion in depth. Peter Burnell and Andrew Reeve set a baseline for political persuasion in 1984 with their work “Persuasion as a Political Concept”. They assert that persuasion can be separated from other, less savory forms of influence (manipulation, coercion, indoctrination, etc.) by a condition of “good faith”, and that persuasion can be an extraordinarily useful tool in the political realm when applied properly¹.

One common school of thought asserts that messaging from the political “elites” has significant impact on how the general public perceives various issues, simply by virtue of coming from leadership.² Donald Searing takes that argument a step further, asserting that political elites possess “political authority”, a dynamic in which people hold a sort of reverent respect for political elites, which “predisposes followers to accept guidance from leaders who leave coercive power in the background and concentrate instead on the desires and beliefs that can produce willing compliance”.³

¹ Peter Burnell and Andrew Reeve, “Persuasion as a Political Concept,” *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (1984).

² Elmer Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); Michael Cobb and James Kuklinski, “Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion,” *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997); John Sanders, “Political Authority,” *The Monist* 66 (1983).

³ Donald Searing, “The Psychology of Political Authority: A Causal Mechanism of Political Learning through Persuasion and Manipulation,” *Political Psychology* 16 (Dec 1995): 693.

Within the realm of political persuasion, the changing tides of public opinion play a significant role. In the most general sense, a Claimant needs to be able to sway the masses in order to bring public opinion around to his way of thinking and ultimately act as a driving force against the Opposition. However, many subscribe to the argument that it is not the political leaders who can manipulate opinion, but rather the media has the most sweeping effect on how political messages resonate with the citizenry.⁴ On the other hand, numerous works speculate that this sought-after public opinion can actually severely limit a political agenda because winning public favor can be difficult.⁵ Of course, there is also a difference between opinions of domestic policy and foreign policy; public interest in foreign policy initiatives tends to decline quickly as time progresses and citizens shift their focus to issues closer to home, leaving political leadership with a disgruntled nation and no good way out. Each of these articles broadly describes the impact of presidential speech on public opinion, but fails to delve further into the rhetorical minutiae which can have a large effect on how the public receives and internalizes political messaging.

⁴ Matthew Baum and Phillip Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *Annual Review of Political Science* (2008); Diana Mutz and Joe Soss, "Reading Public Opinion: The Influence of News Coverage on Perceptions of Public Sentiment," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1997); Matthew McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, (1972); Garry Young and William Perkins, "Presidential rhetoric, the public agenda, and the end of presidential television's 'golden age'," *Journal of Politics* 67 (2005).

⁵ Brandon Rottinghaus, "Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling and the Possible Limits of 'Crafted Talk'," *Political Communication* (2008); Wynton C. Hall, "The Invention of 'Quantifiably Safe Rhetoric': Richard Wirthlin and Ronald Reagan's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion Research in Presidential Discourse," *Western Journal of Communication*, (2002); Matthew Baum, "Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in US Foreign Policy Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2004); L.R. Jacobs and R.Y. Shapiro, *Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

Framing

Framing, or the way by which an argument is constructed and presented to the target audience, is one of the most common devices employed for persuasive or coercive methods. It is a simple device that is used by almost every person every day without thinking; when a child wants his parent to purchase a new toy, the child might employ a “framing” technique to highlight the toy’s educational value and insist that the toy will improve his skills in some manner, attempting to construct that toy as a necessary tool in the mind of his parents, rather than just another piece of plastic collecting dust in a closet. There are a number of renowned scholars who have written about framing effects and a plethora who have applied framing in the context of influencing opinion.⁶ Druckman explains that there are a number of subcategories of framing, with *equivalency framing* and *emphasis framing* being the two most prevalent in political communications.⁷ Much like the scholars of political persuasion, Druckman also agrees that framing is a device best employed by the “elites”.⁸

However, for the purposes of this essay the most applicable definition of framing comes from Cappella & Jamieson who said “A general definition of framing seems to

⁶ Erving Goffman, *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Shanto Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); William Dorman and Steven Livingston, “News and historical content.” *The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (1994); William A. Gamson, *Talking politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1992); William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach.” *American Journal of Sociology* (1989); Todd Gitlin, *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking of the new left*. (University of California Press, 1980); Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, “Issue frames and group-centrism in American public opinion,” *The Journal of Politics* 58 (1996).

⁷ James N. Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence.” *Political Behavior* 23 (2001).

⁸ Ibid.

reduce to ‘the way the story is written or produced,’ including the orienting headlines, the specific words choices, the rhetorical devices employed, the narrative form, and so on.”⁹

Further supporting this definition, Nelson points out that when utilizing framing, the speaker cannot present new ideas to his audience; rather “frames operate by activating information already at the recipients' disposal, stored in long-term memory”.¹⁰ This makes logical sense in terms of a persuasive mechanism. A speaker draws on what his audience *thinks* they already believe about a particular issue and forces the audience to reassess their beliefs using the terms dictated by the speaker.

Rhetoric

From the extensive research above, it is evident that persuasion and frame analysis are certainly critical components to any kind of influential speech. But what about the actual words themselves? Some literature explores rhetoric in a substantive context, describing a change in opinion based on the overall content of the speech rather than the adjectives or phrases used. Jeffrey Cohen theorizes that the more time a president spends on foreign policy in his State of the Union address, the more the public will pay attention to those specific issues mentioned.¹¹

When literature does review the influential effects of language, the focus rests largely on events within the past decade, primarily in the context of war or other military

⁹ Joseph Cappella and Kathleen Jamieson, *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997): 39.

¹⁰ Thomas Nelson, Zoe M. Oxley and Rosalee A. Clawson, “Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects”, *Political Behavior* 19, (1997): 225.

¹¹ Jeffrey Cohen, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda." *American Journal of Political Science*, February (1995).

engagements. In one such article, titled “Rhetoric of Bush Speeches: Purr Words and Snarl Words”, Hoffmann argues that President Bush ‘manipulated’ the public into believing the Iraq War was a just cause. In their analysis of Bush rhetoric before Iraq, Gershkoff and Kushner make a similar case about policy framing: “The Bush administration successfully framed the war in Iraq as an extension of its response to September 11 and the war on terror. The administration juxtaposed allusions to Iraq with the terms *terror*, *bin Laden*, and *al Qaeda*.”¹² Both authors make the case that semantics and repeated use of ‘key terms’ helped convince the American people to support a second theater of war, but there is no conclusive evidence to support their claim.

There are examples of academic work that focus more broadly on the topic of presidential speech in changing the way Americans perceive nations, though these works tend to center around specific events rather than the effect of speech itself.¹³ For example, in her analysis of President Nixon’s speeches during the opening to China in 1972, Michelle Yang highlights the fact that Nixon had to choose his words with great care to appease both a wary American public and a proud Chinese society. Flanagan’s work studies the change in President Wilson’s rhetoric regarding Germany in the years leading up to the First World War, noting that the formerly isolationist president, who originally “did not discriminate between the belligerents”, was forced to “implicitly

¹² Amy Gershkoff and Shauna Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” *Perspectives on Politics*, September (2005): 526.

¹³ Michelle Yang, “President Nixon’s Speeches and Toasts During His 1972 Trip to China: A Study in Diplomatic Rhetoric,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* (2011); Jason Flanagan, “Woodrow Wilson’s “Rhetorical Restructuring”: The Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the German Enemy,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, Summer (2004).

redefine the German government as an enemy of both the United States and mankind”, initiating a style of rhetorical framing which would carry on through future presidents.¹⁴

In terms of protest rhetoric, there is little research that explores that actual words used by protest groups. Much research has been done on the social psychology of “group think” and social movement theory in the broad sense.¹⁵ Social movement theory is then combined with elements of protest rhetoric. For example, scholars have noted that social movement leaders tend to use ‘themes’. In 1969, Scott and Smith described the theme of “haves and have-nots” in both the traditional and contemporary sense. He argues that the rhetoric of this most basic line of division has been brought into the modern day, where “those on the ‘have not’ side of the division... no longer accept designation as an inert mass hoping to receive what they lack through action by the ‘haves.’” In other words, the protest groups are beginning to take charge of their own circumstances rather than wait for upper class leadership to initiate changes.

Another commonly cited theme is “ego function”, which claims that within the protest group, “there appears to be a strong need to recognize and proclaim that one's ego is somehow ignored, or damaged, or disenfranchised.” Richard Gregg cites the Black Power, Women’s Liberation, and student revolution movements as examples of groups who play upon their downtrodden circumstances to ignite passion and provoke insurgence amongst their peers. This theory is likely the closest to what caused the

¹⁴ Flanagan (2004): 138.

¹⁵ Herbert W. Simons, “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements”, *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 61, no. 1 (1970): 3-4.; Charles Tilly, “Social Movements, 1768–2004”, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004); John D McCarthy and Mayer Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”, *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 82, no. 6 (1977): 1213.

uprisings in both the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, as both groups were seriously oppressed and left without a legitimate voice in the government.

Within protest rhetoric, the previously discussed concept of ‘framing’ is also evident. McCarthy et. al. can be applied to this as well, arguing that often social movement participants do not realize they are caught up in a momentous wave until leadership figures reign in the popular feelings and construct a collective message. They are then able to shape the message to fit within popular sentiment, thereby continuing to drive the masses. But in each of these thematic examples, none focuses explicitly on the language employed by the protest groups to determine if it was successful in achieving their end goal.

The Basis for this Research

As evidenced by previous academic works, what scholars of rhetorical devices often fail to overlook is how the effects of specific language can influence a target audience. From a semantics perspective, particular words carry particular connotations. When speechwriters begin crafting language to be delivered, they must literally choose their words carefully. The terms hostile, aggressive, and unfriendly can all be considered synonyms, however it is understood that each carries a distinct tone of decreasing intensity. The specific language employed indicates how the speaker intends his or her audience to perceive a given issue.

Of all the existing literature discussing methods of political persuasion, only one piece of research comes close to addressing the root of the issue this paper seeks to explore. In 2007, Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson wrote “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric”, in which they present

what they call a model of “Rhetorical Coercion”, the basis of which argues that while “we cannot observe directly what people think...we can observe what they say and how they respond to claims and counter-claims.”¹⁶ In other words, politicians cannot constantly perform a psycho-analysis on their audiences to see which words best resonate. Therefore, rhetoric is delivered using a frame (how C chooses to characterize the issue at hand) and the follow-on implications (actions which should occur based on the frame). Their model is hinged on the following:

Seeking to effect change in some policy or ongoing course of action, a claimant (C) directs an argument toward the opposition (O) in view of a public (P). For the purposes of the model, it does not matter whether O has exclusive control over the actions at issue (if O is, for example, the government) or whether C and O share responsibility (if they are, for example, political parties in a legislative assembly). All that matters is that O’s accession or resistance is critical to the outcome.¹⁷

According to Krebs & Jackson, there are four possible outcomes from this theory, which are outlined in Table 1. Each outcome is based on how O responds to C’s rhetoric in terms of the frame and implications.

Table 1: Opposition Response and Outcomes of Rhetorical Contestation

	<i>Accept Frame</i>	<i>Reject Frame</i>
<i>Accept Implications</i>	Case 1: Policy Change	Case 2: Mixed
<i>Reject Implications</i>	Case 3: Implication Contest	Case 4: Framing Contest

¹⁶ Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” *European Journal of International Relations*, (2007): 42.

¹⁷ Krebs & Jackson (2007): 43.

1. **Policy Change.** In Case 1, O accepts both the frame and the implications of C's argument, and policy changes accordingly. For C, this outcome represents an unmitigated triumph.
2. **Mixed.** In Case 2, O accepts the proposed implications and changes the policy, but it rejects C's reasoning. An example would be if an environmental movement (C) urged the government (O) to restrict logging for ecological reasons, and the government agreed to restrict logging but justified the policy shift in economic terms. Though the movement would have won the substantive battle, it might reasonably perceive its victory as less than complete; the government might in the future expand logging rights on economic grounds as easily as it had earlier restricted them on that very basis.
3. **Implication Contest.** O accepts the terms of C's arguments, but rejects the implications that C draws. For example, a lobbying group (C) may argue that high taxes are an unfair burden on the citizenry and should be reduced through an across-the-board reduction in tax rates; a political party (O) may agree that high taxes are problematic but suggest instead targeted tax cuts. As this relatively narrow policy debate occurs *within* a common issue frame, it might be termed an *implication contest*.
4. **Framing Contest.** Here, the two parties disagree about the very terms of debate as well as the policies that follow, and their rhetorical efforts consequently focus on advancing their preferred issue frame in the hope

that their political opponents will accept it (along with the concomitant implications).¹⁸

The Krebs-Jackson formula is an important metric by which we can more easily understand the impact of rhetoric on various audiences. Without this framework, individual case studies could still be analyzed and their outcomes judged according to the opinion of the researcher. Adding the Krebs-Jackson formula, however, forces the analysis into one of four potential outcomes and codifies the information for a much more comprehensible and applicable result.

Selecting the Case Studies

Within the context of political persuasion, this essay asserts that there are three types of scenarios defining the Claimant-Opposition relationship:

1. **Top-Down:** When the political leadership act as the Claimant and attempt to force change on the citizenry (Opposition). For example, a President wishes to enact controversial legislation and must use persuasive rhetoric in order to bring the public around to his point of view.
2. **Bottom-Up:** In this scenario, the citizenry initiates the claim and puts the onus of political change on the leadership (Opposition). For example, a national advocacy group launches a campaign against foreign energy dependency, claiming that the government is supporting terrorism by

¹⁸ Krebs & Jackson (2007): 43-44.

continuing to purchase oil abroad, and demands that the government ban purchasing oil from select nations.

3. **Peer-to-Peer:** Here, politicians attempt to discredit each other, thereby winning the public over to one side or another. For instance, in a campaign, Politician 1 may publically assert that Incumbent Politician 2 has been corrupted by accepting money from questionable political groups, and is calling for voters to unseat Politician 2 in the next election.

Though scholars have cited Krebs and Jackson's theory in other works about framing and influence of rhetoric, none have actually applied their matrix to other scenarios. In their own essay, Krebs and Jackson only apply the tenants of their matrix to one "Bottom-Up" case study in which the minority Druze Arab population in Israel (the Claimants) used coercive rhetoric which ultimately forced Israeli politicians (the Opposition) to acknowledge the Druze as equal status citizens.

Using the logic that Krebs and Jackson have laid out, this essay will apply the formula to three distinctive studies of instances in recent history when one political body (C) used particular rhetoric to persuade their opposition (O). By applying the formula to a broader range of scenarios, a more accurate assessment of the utility of the matrix can be assembled.

There is always the chance that either the matrix or persuasive rhetoric do not have as much utility when applied to certain scenarios, and the intention of this essay is to apply the matrix in as many ways as possible. The case studies were selected deliberately in order to provide a broad range of scenarios and achieve the most comprehensive results possible in this brief analysis. Case Study #1 represents a "Top-

Down” approach, where the American President (C), uses particular rhetoric in his State of the Union address in an attempt to persuade the American people (O/P) to soften their opinion of the Soviet Union. Case Study #2 is another kind of “Bottom-Up” approach, where (C) is a group of protesters using rhetoric to change the political stance of their governments (O) in 1989 and 2011. Finally, Case Study #3 is a “Peer to Peer” approach, in which two rival governments attempt to discredit each other in the public arena and win the West to their side of the argument. Here, Georgia has been selected as the Claimant (C), Russia as the Opposition (O), and the Western world watches as the Public presence (P).

It must be acknowledged that rhetorical persuasion cannot occur in a vacuum. In each of these case studies, as with any scenario, the participants carry preconceived opinions or are heavily influenced by the media or changing events along the way. These variables are nearly impossible to control, particularly in today’s world where external influences are omnipresent and instantaneous. The way in which this variable is accounted for differs in each case study, and is addressed further there. It is important to remember, though, that this essay is more interested in the broader policy outcomes that come from political quorum, rather than whether or not C was able to effect personal doctrinal change in O. In other words, with respect to C’s policy change demands, into which of the four ‘corners’ did C force O due to their successful (or unsuccessful) application of particular coercive rhetoric.

By selecting three distinct case studies, as opposed to three similar ones, the Krebs-Jackson formula is applied in three completely different ways so as to view a variety of possible outcomes in this particular essay. In each case, the rhetoric from C is

first broken down to extract the key words and phrases which evoke strong feeling. Then the Krebs-Jackson formula is applied to determine C's success in wielding strong rhetoric over O. Finally, using the formula as a measuring device, each of the scenarios can be ranked based on the estimated success of C's rhetoric over O. It is the intention that by analyzing the rhetoric employed in each case study and the subsequent outcome of each case, a clear delineation is made between the power of rhetoric and the overall influence of C in each different scenario, based on the response (or lack thereof) by O.

CHAPTER ONE: THE RHETORIC OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECT OF REAGAN'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION (A TOP-DOWN CASE STUDY)

In today's presidential reality, the opinions of the American people matter greatly to the success or failure of policies, particularly when it comes to foreign affairs. Yet persuading the public is not an easy task, especially when faced with the 24 hour news cycle that can spin a president's foreign policy agenda out of control. Presidents are granted very few opportunities to speak directly to the Congress and to the American people about their policy objectives without additional filtering from the media. The State of the Union Address, however, allows presidents one such occasion to choose their words carefully and shape their messages specifically to influence how Americans perceive policies or, in the case of this study, foreign nations.

Since the birth of the United States, foreign nations have acted as allies, adversaries, and everything in between. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has been tumultuous and marked by decades of animosity.¹⁹ At varying points throughout that history, presidents needed the American public to perceive the Soviet Union either favorably or unfavorably, depending on what the prevailing policy initiatives happened to be. In the terms of Krebs-Jackson, Presidents utilize rhetorical coercion in their annual State of the Union Address to subconsciously force the American people to think or feel differently about varying issues. This particular case study will

¹⁹ Throughout the time period covered by this particular case study, the name of the Soviet Union sometimes fluctuated between some variation of 'Russia', 'Soviet Russia' or 'Soviet Union'. To maintain continuity throughout the case study, the country will always be referred to as the Soviet Union, except when quoting a direct source which says otherwise.

focus on President Reagan's use of rhetoric to persuade the American public during his first and second Administrations.

Rollback: The Reagan Doctrine

After decades of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, President Reagan was the first to experience a promising thaw, leading ultimately to the fall of the Berlin Wall just months after Reagan left office. Throughout his presidency, Reagan took a much more openly proactive – and sometimes provocative – approach to battling the global spread of Communism. Most presidents before him feared any sudden moves which might provoke the Soviets into launching a nuclear attack, and therefore practiced “containment”, or an attempt to prevent further spreading of Communism. Reagan, however, was committed to ending the stalemate once and for all. As early as four years before his election, Reagan remarked to Richard V. Allen, a man who would later become Reagan's National Security Advisor, that ““My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple... We win and they lose. What do you think of that?””²⁰ This new mentality of challenging the Soviet Union and their doctrine head-on became known as “rollback”.

Implementing the rollback policy was one challenge, but selling the American people on a new era of improved relations with the Soviet Union was entirely another. In the early 1980s, a sizeable portion of the population had never known life without the looming threat of nuclear war. A line of presidents before Reagan had tried and thus far

²⁰ Richard Allen, “The Man Who Won the Cold War,” *The Hoover Digest*, January (2000).

failed to bring about any change; why should Reagan's confrontational approach merit public support?

This chapter analyzes the effect of President Reagan's State of the Union rhetorical coercion to determine if he was able to convince the American public to view the Soviet Union in a different light. In this instance, President Reagan represents the Claimant (C), while the American Public shares the role of Opposition (O) and public (P). At the conclusion of this Case Study, the Krebs-Jackson formula is applied to calculate the overall outcome of the results, and to determine if President Reagan was indeed successful in coercing the American public into hoping for a successful rollback.

Data Utilized

Historical State of the Union Addresses are used as a database from which a trend of descriptive words and phrases is determined, while the polling data provide a way to gauge how (or if) the American people respond to the rhetoric. Polling data was selected from Gallup, the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center General Social Survey (NORC-GSS), and the Times Mirror, first because each of these organizations asked identical questions of their participants, and second because each of these groups offered a semi-annual survey which gives consistency to their data.²¹ Through a combination of these groups a rough trend line emerged, offering consistent

²¹ Times Mirror was purchased in 2000 by Tribune Co.

data over a period of nine years, spanning some of the most critical points in US-Soviet relations.²² For the complete polling data and subsequent trend line, see Appendix A.

Method of Analysis

For the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on State of the Union Addresses delivered by President Ronald Reagan between 1982 and 1988. This range of dates was selected for two reasons: first, those dates represent the years leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the run-up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a whole. That particular period of time was critical in American history and represented the culmination of decades of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, President Reagan's legacy is largely centered on his interactions with the Soviet Union, lending particular credence to his words during this time.

Each State of the Union address was combed for mentions of the Soviet Union – both direct and indirect – and passages believed to hold particular power or emotion were selected. Table 2 below shows a count of positive, negative, and neutral references throughout each State of the Union Address. Each passage was coded according to its general sentiment: positive (green), negative (red), or neutral (yellow).²³ This provides a visual portrayal of the general tone of each speech. Finally, specific words and phrases from each selection were bolded to emphasize those pieces which induce feeling. For a color-coded visual aid, see Appendix B.

²² In one instance, survey years overlapped. In the year 1983, polling data was available from both Gallup and NORC-GSS. In this case, the two numbers were averaged together. For the other years when there was only one dataset, I simply used those numbers to complete the trend line.

²³ Passages were selected and assigned a code based upon the personal feeling of this author. The code 'neutral' was assigned to those passages which did not evoke strong feelings in either direction.

Table 2: Number of Positive, Negative, and Neutral References toward the Soviet Union in State of the Union Addresses

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Positive	5	4	7	6	12	2	5	4	5
Negative	45	54	5	2	0	5	5	10	0
Neutral	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0

The analysis is based on two types of polling questions which most directly asked the necessary information. First, “is your overall opinion of Russia very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” and second, “You notice that the ten boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus five – for something you have a very favorable opinion of – to minus five – for something you have a very unfavorable opinion of. Please tell me how far up the scale or how far down the scale you rate this nation: Russia.”²⁴ These questions, of the many variations asked by different polling groups, probe for the necessary information most directly while avoiding as many external variables as possible.

Why Analyze State of the Union Addresses?

Though presidents give dozens of speeches over the course of a year, the State of the Union address is a highly-anticipated event marking the culmination of months of preparation. And rightly so, as the State of the Union is the only time throughout the year when the President is constitutionally obligated to address both the Congress and the

²⁴ In cases where participants were asked to rank their feelings on a scale of +5 to -5, I took the aggregate of each section (+1 to +5 and -1 to -5) to achieve a general ‘favorable’ or ‘unfavorable’ rating.

nation as a whole. It is also the most-watched presidential event throughout the year, and the one time annually that the Oval Office has a captive audience. Thus, the speech is carefully planned down to the last comma so as to deliver the most accurate, hard-hitting, and influential message possible. That is to say, the wording selected for the State of the Union address is done so deliberately and with great intention. Each descriptive word chosen to depict foreign nations within the State of the Union address has a specific message to convey, and is seeking a particular reaction from the public.

Furthermore, in the late-20th century the barrage of 24-hour media had yet to permeate the American lifestyle, and only the most critical of speeches made it to the public (i.e., the State of the Union, statements of war, and other national crises). To ensure the speeches were significant enough to reach a broad base of the American people, it made the most sense to analyze only State of the Union Addresses.

Another factor to consider is unspoken messaging. There are many instances in which presidents – always consummate politicians – never specifically reference rival nations by name. Rather, they allude to countries which are losing favor with the United States by using vague terminology, lumping them into large groupings, or giving speeches centered on ideological themes. In cases such as these, it is much more difficult to measure the actual effect of the speech on public opinion, as some people are much more adept at picking up on subtleties in messaging than others.

Of course, rhetoric does not occur in a vacuum. When Presidents speak to their audiences, it is within a context of both historical and current events. In most cases, the populace will have a pre-formed opinion of the issue at hand. It is then the task of the president to use the tools he has at his disposal – in this case, his rhetoric – to try and

persuade the public to change their position or form a new opinion. This only reinforces the need for the Claimant to use rhetoric that both conveys the desired message and influences the audience enough to change their minds. In this particular case, the effect of outside influencers was kept to a minimum by analyzing polling data that was collected as immediately as possible after the State of the Union speech was given; as is seen in Appendix A, all but one of the polls were taken in January of that particular year. This would allow for the least amount of time for the media to offer their own interpretations of what the President “meant” to say, thereby acquiring the purest data from the polling sample.

Setting a Baseline

At the beginning of President Carter’s tenure in the 1970s, the Soviet Union was rarely mentioned in State of the Union speeches, possibly in a hope that by not aggravating the issue it would simply vanish. However, after a series of historic events in late 1979 – principally the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran Hostage Crisis – favorability ratings toward the Soviets were measured at 14 percent favorable and 84 percent unfavorable.²⁵ Subsequently, in a manner most unlike the previously dove-ish President Carter, the 1980 and 1981 State of the Union Addresses employ incredibly forceful rhetoric. Words like ‘danger’, ‘threat’, and ‘aggression’ are used liberally throughout the texts. He speaks of the Soviet ‘assault’ on Afghanistan, an “effort to dominate” the country, and the use of “power for colonial conquest”. He frequently references the condemnation of Soviet actions by the world community, saying “a vast

²⁵ Gallup Poll #147G, 01/22/1980

majority of nations have condemned this attempt”, and “no action of world power has ever been so quickly condemned”.²⁶ Within his address, President Carter either references or makes explicit mention of the Soviet Union in no fewer than seventeen paragraphs.

During his final days as President in 1981, Jimmy Carter gave a concluding State of the Union Address to Congress. Within that speech, Carter continued to use rather inflammatory terminology which gave the American public a sense that our tactics toward the Soviets had once again reverted to antagonism. Variations on ‘aggression’ could be counted seven times throughout the speech, while ‘threat’ was utilized six times. He discussed the “destructive and aggressive policies” of the Soviets which have “added immeasurably to the suffering” of the people of Afghanistan.²⁷ Carter refers to the Soviet ‘invasion’ no fewer than nine times, adding that it poses “the most serious threat to peace since World War II”. He also emphasizes the blatant disregard for rule of law, noting that by occupying Afghanistan, the Soviets committed a “callous violation of international law”.²⁸

But for all that rhetoric, America softened a bit on the Soviets; unfavorable ratings dipped to 77 percent and favorable rose six points to 20 percent.²⁹ President Carter faded into history as a passive leader, and was quickly replaced by Ronald Reagan, the man who changed the way America perceived the Soviet Union.

²⁶ President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980

²⁷ President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 16, 1981

²⁸ President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 16, 1981

²⁹ Gallup Poll #168G, 01/27/1981

Rhetorical Analysis Results

The Reagan Years: Part I

The election of President Ronald Reagan brought an entirely different set of values and rhetoric to the Oval Office. During his very first State of the Union in 1982, Reagan spoke less about the Soviet Union than previous presidents; when the Soviet Union was mentioned, a majority of the words conveyed encouragement and optimism for the rival nation, particularly with regard to arms negotiations. He used words phrases like “already initiated negotiations” and “working for a reduction of arms” to describe the active nature of relations, and give the American people hope that the situation would not remain stagnant.³⁰

On the other hand, Reagan balanced his optimism with a realist sense of caution, reminding Americans that the Soviets were still a hostile force looking to topple US world influence. The words ‘empire’ and ‘regime’ communicate a sense of repressive government, and he reinforces that with vivid imagery phrases, such as “we've never needed walls or minefields or barbed wire to keep our people in.”³¹ More than once he referenced the “unrelenting buildup” of Soviet military power, emphasizing again that our adversaries would not go quietly into the night.

The 1982 polling data shows that unfavorable ratings did not move from the previous year, but that favorable ratings went up by 3 percent.³² I would attribute the

³⁰ President Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, January 26, 1982

³¹ Ibid.

³² NORC Annual General Social Survey, 1982

slight uptick in favorability to the newly balanced approach and Reagan's famed slogan "trust but verify". President Reagan communicated to the American people that the United States was willing and able to negotiate with the Soviets, as long as we proceed with caution. The American public responded with equally tentative optimism.

The year 1983 was a relatively quiet one in US-Soviet relations, yet American public opinion of their country dropped to 15 percent favorable and spiked to 83 percent unfavorable.³³ The death of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and subsequent installation of Yuri Andropov, should have commanded a sense of optimism given the new leadership and chance for a fresh start. Still, President Reagan held firm in his balanced approach to describing the Soviet Union to the American people.

His 1983 State of the Union Address offered both encouraging and tentative descriptions of the Soviets. President Reagan began with many positive references, using terms like "strategy for peace" and "positive change in relations", referring to the new leadership in the Soviet Union.³⁴ He employed active verbs like "pursuing" to discuss the ongoing arms reduction negotiations, offering encouragement that a settlement might yet be reached. But Reagan was also careful to maintain the upper hand, using words like "threaten" and "invade", "overwhelming evidence" and "violation" to describe some of the shortfalls of the Soviet government.³⁵ Unfortunately, the stunning drop in public opinion does not seem to match up with the relatively steady rhetoric utilized by President Reagan that year.

³³ Average of NORC Annual General Social Survey, 1983 and Gallup Poll #224G, 09/13/1983

³⁴ President Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, January 25, 1983

³⁵ Ibid.

The year 1984 saw perhaps the most positive message delivered about the Soviet Union since they were allied with the United States in World War II. President Reagan had nothing but optimistic, encouraging words about the Soviets throughout the whole of his State of the Union speech, beginning with “a more stable basis for peaceful relations”.³⁶ He then went on to speak directly to the Soviet people, a tactic which had also had a positive effect on the American people. President Reagan uses emotional phrases such as “our sons and daughters have never fought each other in war”. He calls them “people of the Soviet” on multiple occasions, giving the Soviet Union a sense of humanity that had henceforth been disregarded. He discusses ‘faith’ and ‘friendship’ and “our children’s children”, all terms which evoke commonalities between individuals.³⁷

For all that heartening rhetoric, there appears to be no measure of public opinion in the year 1984. Based on the steadily rising trend in the surrounding years, however, one could infer that the American people responded favorably to Reagan’s leadership and optimism. This small rise in favorability was just the beginning of a much larger change, for the most dramatic shift in public opinion was yet to come.

The Reagan Years: Part II

Some of the most extraordinary changes came in 1985 – the year which would transform the structure of the Soviet Union forever. In what was becoming a strange sort of routine, Soviet President Yuri Andropov died in early 1984, was replaced by President Konstantin Chernenko, who also died just twelve months later. Reagan’s 1985 State of

³⁶ President Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, January 25, 1984

³⁷ Ibid.

the Union reflected some of the uncertainty he had toward the ever-changing Soviet leadership. Though he remained “committed” to determining a fair arms settlement, he also expressed some of the sternest rhetoric about the Soviets since taking office. Reagan emphasized the constant buildup of Soviet defense systems, referring to bases for “Communist terrorists”, “Soviet-supported aggression” and full “Soviet-bloc support”.³⁸ Surprisingly though, the public responded favorably to the Soviet Union, improving favorability ratings to 23 percent and decreasing unfavorable ratings to 77 percent.³⁹

The bizarre recurring deaths of Soviet leaders led to the installation of President Mikhail Gorbachev, with whom President Reagan would develop a great and historic relationship. The ensuing State of the Union in 1986 reflects the sincerity of that relationship. For one thing, President Reagan began referring to the Soviet leadership by name, mentioning “Mr. Gorbachev’s upcoming visit to America”.⁴⁰ Previously referred to as “the Soviet regime” or “the Soviet leadership”, this minor act gave added humanity to the Soviets that had previously been omitted. He also describes a more “stable relationship” with the Soviet Union and his “hope” for the upcoming summit in Geneva.

Despite the new changes afoot, Reagan maintains an even keel between the hopeful messages and constructive criticism. He talks of Soviet “drive for domination”, “threats”, and “state terror”. He describes them as a country which “exports ideology by force”.⁴¹ But it is clear that the American public was energized by Reagan’s evident

³⁸ President Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, February 6, 1985

³⁹ NORC Annual General Social Survey, 1985.

⁴⁰ President Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, February 4, 1986

⁴¹ Ibid.

relationship with Gorbachev, and they took his words of familiarity to heart. Favorability ratings made a leap to 34 percent, while the unfavorable ratings declined to 66 percent, the lowest they had been since 1977.⁴²

Any goodwill created by the relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev was lost on the American people just one year later, though, as favorable public opinion of the Soviets fell a bit in 1987; favorable ratings dropped to 25 percent while unfavorable ratings rose to 71 percent.⁴³ This could be attributed to Reagan's 1987 State of the Union Address, which espoused some of the most vehement rhetoric thus far in his presidency.

Reagan makes a full reversal in his language, speaking of "brutal war", "Soviet beachhead" and "Communist domination". He calls the Soviets a 'regime', and uses vivid imagery to describe a point at which the Soviets "sought to cripple our strategic defense initiative". It is clear that he wants the American people to not let their guard down when it comes to Soviet power, emphasizing their "single minded determination to advance their power". However, Reagan still maintains that sense of balance and optimism about the future of US-Soviet relations, using terms like "we always remain open", "progress", and "more open contacts between our societies".⁴⁴

President Reagan's famous "Tear Down this Wall" speech was given in June, 1987, followed by a January 1988 State of the Union address which focused solely on the progress being made in the Soviet Union. Reagan referred to Mr. Gorbachev by name

⁴² NORC Annual General Social Survey, 1986

⁴³ Times Mirror Poll, May, 1987

⁴⁴ President Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, January 27, 1987

twice, giving emphasis to the newfound respect between the two world leaders. He discussed the reduction of arms and the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, using such encompassing terms as “all troops are removed”.⁴⁵

Most would assume that the hope and determination espoused in those words would be enough to spark a revelation at home with regard to America’s thoughts toward the Soviet Union. However, the polling data shows otherwise. Though there is a slight uptick in ‘favorable’ ratings between 1987 and 1988, the ‘unfavorables’ hold perfectly steady at a high 71 percent.⁴⁶






















Analysis of Rhetoric

Between the years 1982 and 1988, there are some significant shifts in favorable vs. unfavorable opinion, yet the question is whether or not President Reagan’s rhetoric had a direct impact on those results. One would generally assume that if negative rhetoric about the Soviet Union was more prevalent, the natural response would be an uptick in unfavorable ratings with a simultaneous decrease in favorable ratings. Conversely, an increase in positive and encouraging rhetoric should elicit improved favorable ratings and a drop in unfavorable. And in fact, this is largely the trend that emerges.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Average of Times Mirror Poll, January 1988 and NORC Annual General Social Survey, 1988

Table 3: Increases or Decreases Compared to Numbers from the Previous Year to show Correlation

Year	Negative References	Positive References	Favorables	Unfavorables
1982				No Change from previous year
1983				
1985				
1986	No Change from previous year			
1987				
1988				No Change from previous year

In 1982, Reagan's negative references are almost non-existent compared to President Carter's aggressive address the year before. He also included much more positive rhetoric, and we see a rise in favorability ratings, but there is no substantial change in unfavorable ratings from the 1981 polling. 1983 saw even fewer negative references, but also fewer positive references from Reagan's first State of the Union. As such, favorable ratings fell along with those positive references, and the unfavorable ratings did see a slight uptick as well. Conclusion: the public did respond to his positive remarks.

The year 1985 is a bit of an anomaly when, although there was an increase in negative rhetoric and corresponding decrease in positive rhetoric, the public opinion ratings did exactly the opposite. Since there is nothing in this dataset which explains this anomaly, it is fair to assume that there may have been external influences at work which are not measured in this particular study, such as particularly negative media coverage or an event that is not referenced in the State of the Union speech.

For the remainder of President Reagan's administration, it would appear that the American public responded quite well to his positive rhetoric about the Soviet Union. In 1986, 1987, and 1988 the public favorability ratings always moved along with Reagan's positive references. Likewise, the 'unfavorable' ratings showed a corresponding inverse relationship, decreasing with more positive rhetoric and increasing or showing no change if there was less positive rhetoric, as is shown in Table 3 above.

An unexpected discovery was that public opinion responded much more to the positive rhetoric than to the negative rhetoric, evident in the fact that the positive rhetoric seemed to have the most direct and correlating relationship with the public opinion polling results.

Applying the Krebs-Jackson Formula

After analyzing the rhetoric and the subsequent public opinion polling, we can apply the Krebs-Jackson formula to determine the outcome. In this case study, the Frame employed by President Reagan painted the Soviet Union as an adversary that was trying to rebuild itself as an ally. The Implications which follow suggest that the American people reconsider the Soviet Union and accept the new policy of 'rollback'. In light of the results above, Case 3 (Implication Contest) is the most logical outcome. Based on the

way the favorability ratings moved along with Reagan's increasingly positive rhetoric, one can surmise that the American people (O) did accept the implications of Reagan's arguments; i.e. that the relationship with the Soviet Union needed to improve. However, they did not entirely accept the framing of the Soviet Union as a potential partner in the near future. Had the implications also been accepted (Case 1), the favorable public opinion of the Soviet Union would have spiked much higher in anticipation of an imminent improvement in relations.

Table 4: Possible Results of Case Study 1

	<i>Accept Frame</i>	<i>Reject Frame</i>
	Case 1: Policy Change	Case 2: Mixed
<i>Accept Implications</i>	The American people believe the Soviet Union is changing fundamentally and support a new relationship through 'rollback'	The American people do not believe the Soviet Union is changing fundamentally, but support a new relationship through 'rollback'
	Case 3: Implication Contest	Case 4: Framing Contest
<i>Reject Implications</i>	The American people believe the Soviet Union is changing fundamentally but do not support a new relationship through 'rollback'	The American people do not believe the Soviet Union is changing fundamentally and do not support a new relationship through 'rollback'

In Case 2, the American people would reject the framing of the Soviet Union as a communist nation seeking change, but accept the Presidential implications that the United States could ally with the Soviets in the future. This case is not entirely dissimilar from Case 3; however, the reason this is not the outcome is that over a period of analysis, the ratings did not experience a significant change. The favorable ratings improved slightly,

and the unfavorable ratings fell slightly – just enough to indicate a cautious optimism about the situation at hand. But it is clear that the American people are not yet ready to embrace a fundamental shift in the world order. Case 4 does not make much sense in this context either. If the American people had rejected Presidential implications of the Soviet Union through his rhetoric, and also rejected his framing of the issue, favorability ratings would have plummeted while the unfavorable ratings soared

Drawing Conclusions

This first case study is revealing because it is the exact opposite of the case study Krebs-Jackson used in their original essay. Rather than discuss the effects a group of citizens has on the government, Chapter One focuses on the way the Government might use rhetoric to persuade the citizenry. We recall the two questions this essay seeks to answer: first, was C successful in effecting policy change by persuading O through rhetoric? And second, is the Krebs-Jackson formula an appropriate metric by which to measure this success?

To answer question one, it is evident that through his rhetoric, Reagan was unable to successfully persuade the American people to reconsider Soviet foreign policy. The evidence suggests that the American people – taking cues from Reagan’s firm yet optimistic tone – may have believed the future held some hope for a new partnership between the two rival nations. Yet that hope was likely tempered by a myriad of external factors such as pessimistic news reporting, preconceived bias, or current events.

However, to answer question two, perhaps the Krebs-Jackson formula is not as appropriate in this “Top-Down” context. Unlike a “Bottom-Up” example like the one Krebs-Jackson originally used, it is much more difficult for Government leadership to

‘force’ their citizens into any decision. At the end of the day, the Government officials wield the power to change policy regardless of public opinion. By applying the formula to this particular case study, we are able to organize what the American public may have been thinking with regard to Soviet policy, and the formula did provide a fascinating lens through which the changes in public opinion could be viewed. This does not, however, have any direct impact on altering American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Thus, for Chapter One, it can be concluded that both the Krebs-Jackson formula and Reagan’s rhetoric were not successful.

CHAPTER TWO: RHETORIC OF REVOLUTION: COMPARING 1988 POLAND WITH 2011 TUNISIA PROTESTS (A BOTTOM-UP CASE STUDY)

Revolution has been a part of civil society as far back as recorded history will allow; citizens become frustrated with the status quo and band together to effect political change. The common cause of grassroots protests manifests itself in the rhetoric the groups use to influence their target audience. Chants, slogans, posters and catch-phrases all become fundamental building blocks of protests, and the primary vehicle by which the groups deliver their ideology to seemingly errant politicians.

Though there are hundreds of examples of protests throughout history, the protests examined in this study are distinctive in that they were the initial kick-off sites for a larger “pan-revolutionary” movement in their respective regions. In 1988, the Polish protests activated a chain of similar protests throughout the satellite countries which eventually brought the Soviet Union to its knees. Twenty-two years later, a group of Tunisian protesters sparked a movement which would rip across the Middle East and upend the status quo in over a dozen countries. Rarely in history has such a reactionary effect occurred, and even more rarely did the political parties in power go quietly into the night.

Unlike the first Case Study which analyzed the typical top-down relationship of a politician attempting to influence his public audience, this second Case Study looks at the influential power of rhetoric from the bottom-up. The driving interest in this case study is to determine whether the protesters (C), through their common rhetoric, were able to exert influence over their respective authoritarian governments (O) to effect regime change.

A Brief History of the 1989 Revolutions

In 1989, the entire world watched in utter astonishment as the Iron Curtain began to come down with little warning and little reaction from Communist leadership. One by one, nations under the thumb of the Kremlin gathered their courage and demanded that their governments take responsibility for the needs of their people. In Poland, the beginnings of revolution began back in 1980 when Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Wałęsa were fired from the V. Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. Poland had been wrestling with worker's rights since the end of World War II, and the sacking of Walentynowicz and Wałęsa was the final straw. Standing in unity with their wronged colleagues, the entire shipyard went on strike and formed a workers union they called Solidarność, or Solidarity.⁴⁷ Solidarity eventually grew to leverage impressive political power for its day, with Lech Wałęsa leading the charge as the symbolic figure, culminating in series of widespread strikes in the fall of 1988. As productivity across the country ground to a halt, Communist party leadership agreed to meet with Solidarity for roundtable negotiations, a milestone to legitimizing the group within the political sphere.⁴⁸ The negotiations were over by 1989, ending the worker's strikes, and granting Solidarity and other popular groups political power and spots on the ballot in June. The election was a landslide in favor of Solidarity, and one by one pro-Communist politicians were ousted from positions of power. Before the end of 1989, Poland had successfully and peacefully

⁴⁷ Ekiert Grzegorz and Jan Kubik, "Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993", (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999): 38.

⁴⁸ Grzegorz & Kubik, "Rebellious Civil Society", 43.

dismantled the Communist government, officially the first to shed their oppressive leadership, though by no means the last.

Similar scenes were played out in nations across Eastern Europe as 1989 drew to a close; Hungary was next to shake off their Communist government, followed in quick succession by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. In each situation, two remarkable things occurred: first, in all but the case of Romania, Communist leadership slipped quietly into the background with little to no retaliation toward the people – a response no one predicted. Second and most important for the purposes of this essay, the people of each nation emerged from the shadows of their existence and came together *en masse* to protest. After leading double lives for decades – one for public consumption and one for commiserating amongst friends in private – something roused the populace enough to convince them that this was the time for action.

A Brief History of the Arab Spring

Just over twenty years later, people took to the streets again in droves protesting their oppressive governments and calling for change. This time, the spark to set the fires ablaze came from Tunisia – and quite literally. When Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire in protest of the government, smart phones immediately notified the world via Tweets, Facebook posts, and photo uploads. Middle Eastern nations latched onto the opportunity and spontaneous protests erupted across the region. Citizens of these Arab countries emerged from their shadowed existence – quite similarly to the 1989 revolutions – and stood together to face their authoritarian governments. Only this time, the governments did not go quietly. In some instances, the protests

disintegrated into violent uproar; military forces were dispatched, citizens were beaten down, and some rebellions were crushed before they were able to gain momentum.

A few of the protests, however, did gain traction. Groups in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and a handful of other countries were persuasive enough to create a groundswell of support and eventually topple their respective regimes. While describing the scene in Cairo, Ajami seems to capture the sentiment of the entire revolution: “For 18 magical days in January and February, Egyptians of all walks of life came together in Tahrir Square demanding to be rid of [President Mubarak].”⁴⁹ For better or for worse, citizens across the Middle East came together for a common cause and shared their frustrations with their governments and the world.

Data Utilized

Between the 1989 Revolutions and the Arab Spring Protests, there is over 24 countries’ worth of material to analyze. To keep the scope of this analysis relatively focused, only countries which successfully ousted their existing governments through popular protest were selected. Within the Arab Spring, that includes only four countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Matching those four countries to the Communist Revolutions, the most relevant corresponding selections were Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania.⁵⁰ To further narrow the scope, this essay compares the originating protest in Poland with the originating protest in Tunisia, as the rhetoric displayed in these two instances sets the tone for the rest of the countries that follow.

⁴⁹ Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously." *Foreign Affairs* 91 (2012): 59.

The Polish protests occurred without aid from the internet, much less social media platforms. The primary form of communication was via pamphlets, signage, banners, and word of mouth. As word of mouth is not a feasible source of data for this analysis, the most logical focus is tangible data such as historical photos and archived pamphlets. Some scholarly works also included descriptions of commonly seen slogans, which are also included in the data pool.

In contrast, gathering data from the Tunisian protests was overwhelming as the event took place in full view of the public using the internet and social media platforms. There is a great deal of archived material on the internet, so to narrow the scope, focus is placed on the four most widely accessible platforms: photos, Facebook, Twitter, and blogs. These data sources provide the best access to firsthand accounts of what was happening in real time; photos taken by journalists or protesters in the midst of action, Facebook and blog postings by protest leaders, and Tweets from participants in the middle of the action. Though there are a myriad of news and journal articles that also cover the protests in great depth, these were excluded from the dataset as they do not provide a snapshot of the raw emotion required for this analysis.

Factors to Consider

As both revolutions took place in non-English speaking countries, the available literature is largely not in English. Wherever possible, native speakers were engaged to provide translation and interpretation, or pre-translated versions of the data were

utilized.⁵¹ In some cases, however, the phrases were put into an online translator – Google Translate – and the subsequent interpretation is what is used for analysis. The automated translations may not be entirely accurate, as is expected of a computerized service, though the ‘gist’ of the emotion comes through without hindrance. It is this ‘gist’ that I am seeking to document, so precise translations are rendered unnecessary.

Another consideration is the availability of data. As mentioned before, the majority of data for the Polish revolution comes from internet archives and scholarly books. Additional data and archived materials are available at various universities across the country, but a lack of resources meant traveling to access the archives was unfeasible. In a similar way, Tunisian protest data posed a paradoxical problem: both too much and not enough material to analyze. Though there is a nearly infinite amount of archived data through Twitter and Facebook, the sheer volume makes it impossible to sort and accurately analyze the data. To remedy this situation, the top-recommended Facebook and Twitter accounts were skimmed for high-activity around specific events. This presented the best representation from when popular emotion and leadership activism were at their peak, and I am confident that the data analysis will not suffer greatly as a result.

On the other side of the same coin, much of the Arab Spring archived data has been made inaccessible by Twitter or Facebook due to their respective privacy policies or individual account deactivation; after all, the peak of the Middle East protests occurred

⁵¹ Special thanks and credit goes to Mrs. Katarzyna Conolly, a native Polish speaker and friend who provided translation for the Solidarity posters and pamphlets, viewed in Appendix C.

almost three years before this essay was written. Twitter does not permit search by date, forcing the user to literally scroll through thousands of tweets by hand, and stops allowing access to historical data after a certain point. Therefore, it was difficult to gather much of the Twitter data from December 2010-June 2011 and had to rely on third-party sources such as Global Voices and Twitoaster.com which archived the information on their own sites. Additionally, many of the Facebook accounts which were active during the peak months have either been deactivated or closed by Facebook.

As with any other situation played out in public, there are external forces at work which help influence O beyond the rhetoric of C. The role of outside forces impacting the position of O in these two samples varies. In 1989 Poland, O (the Polish Government) would have been influenced by grander Soviet political pressures attempting to counter the growing anti-Soviet movement among the populace. Since the reach of the media was still restricted in Poland, it is much easier to isolate the Solidarity protest movement as a compelling force. In Tunisia, however, the entire protest movement was played out in the media and over the internet. Not only could anyone with internet access voice an opinion about what the Tunisian government should or should not do, but Western governments were also conspicuously involved in pressuring the regime through more official channels. It is virtually impossible to isolate the impact of Tunisian protest rhetoric when working with open-source material; however, the presumption in this case is that Tunisia, being the first of the Arab Spring movements, initiated the subsequent chain of events with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi. As a result, the events in Tunisia were driven by that first act and not by other precedent, making the Tunisian protest itself a ‘purer’ sample. The media and other external

influencers – still waiting with baited breath as the unbelievable story unfolded – took their cues from the protesters.

Part A: The Polish Protests, 1988

The political union Solidarity was a driving force during the Polish revolution. Therefore, a vast majority of the signs and pamphlets from that time were either sponsored by or referenced Solidarity in some way – both in the sense of the group’s name as well as the sentiment. Common rhetorical themes included unity, helping one another, and general references to freedom and better living standards. The majority of the posters read more like political campaigns than anti-government propaganda. For example, one poster gives a date and time for a political rally with the words “Fighting Solidarity invites for manifestation [demonstration] under the slogan ‘We Demand Free Elections’”, another shows a broken chain link fence and reads “A vote for Solidarity is a step toward freedom”, while a number of photos depict protest groups demanding “registration of Solidarity without any alteration of the Statute”.⁵² One photo shows a series of graffiti that pleads “Let [there be] free and independent trade unions and world peace” or “Justice and equality for the entire nation” or even “Only Solidarity and patience”. Hardly the rhetoric of angry mobs seeking to dismantle their regime!

As a number of offshoot groups began to emerge from Solidarity, their posters still reflected the same style of messaging initiated by the parent. Fighting Solidarity was one such group, whose poster harkens an “independent and democratic Poland”. There are a few examples of when the rhetoric took on a more aggressive tone, which was

⁵² The posters and pamphlets used for analysis can be found in Appendix C.

usually in response to government crackdowns. For example, one flyer drew on the sympathies of protesters for the plight of one Solidarity leader, Jan Rulewski, who had recently fallen victim to some military brutality, while some street graffiti reads “We Revenge Rulewski”. But even then, the posters call for additional strikes in response, not an armed rebellion, saying “Enough lawlessness!” This fed directly into the idea of ‘citizenry’, a common theme which acted in direct opposition to the pure nationalism and oppression espoused by the government. As Timothy Ash explains, “the word most often used to describe the people as opposed to the authorities was *społeczeństwo*, ‘society’”.⁵³

Perhaps one of the most powerful posters depicts a crowd of people and reads “What are we waiting for?” in large letters. The poster encourages all who view it to take a stand for change, telling the reader that “if you would still have it be as it is, you are lost”. The poster depicts “change” as a “friend”, “disagreement” as a “partner”, and insists that “you have to create something from nothing”. It ends with “what you have, you will waive [surrender], and YOU WILL TAKE WHAT HAS BEEN DENIED TO YOU”. The tone of this poster is clearly insubordinate, and encourages taking a stand against the current situation, suggesting that anyone satisfied with their lot in life are “lost”. The language used, though, is not necessarily angry; by depicting “change” and “disagreements” as “friends” and “partners”, the tone suggests challenging the status quo using non-violent, diplomatic means.

⁵³ Timothy Ash, “The Year of Truth”, in *The Revolutions of 1989*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu, (London: Routledge, 1999): 117.

Oftentimes, Solidarity would distribute their message through poems, or ballads which workers would sing with one another. One of the most well-known is the *Ballad of the Striking Miners* which depicts the feelings of miners sitting around during one of their many strikes. A portion of the translated poem reads:

“The coal just lays there; No one is mining it
Laying in huge piles; Nobody is loading it
There are no ministers; There are no generals
All of Poland is waiting; waiting for news from us
The newspapers deceives; The radio deceives
Tell us today, tell us now; What is wrong in Poland”⁵⁴

The sentiment from this poem portrays the confusion and helplessness of the Polish people, and lets them know that they are not alone in their feeling. This served as a successful tactic for encouraging citizens to have courage in the fight against Communist oppression. It also fed directly into the theme of unity which Solidarity was toiling to build in Poland, confirming that the people were correct to be suspicious of the government and to trust no one but each other. For a people who for so long had lived their lives in relative solitude to escape the prying eyes of the Kremlin, an outward display of unity was difficult to grasp. Of course, it was also critical in order for the work of Solidarity to gain traction and make progress in Poland.

Another group that was instrumental in creating a sense of unity was the Polish Catholic Church. Despite some ideological discrepancies, Solidarity and the Church

⁵⁴ Unknown, "Ballad of the Striking Miners: Ballada Strajkujacych Gornikow!" *Making the History of 1989*, Item #703, http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/ballad-of-striking-coalminers_86bbe915ed.pdf

were natural allies as both were marginalized groups in the eyes of the Communist party. The church contributed to Solidarity's efforts in a myriad of ways, from providing accommodations for traveling leaders to using the pulpit as a platform for distributing political information. In addition, the church was the one place that citizens could gather *en mass* without raising too many alarms. Despite this deep involvement, the evidence does not show religious rhetoric being used during the protests. The examples of rhetoric listed above are all secular in nature.

It is clear from the posters that the main goal of Solidarity and its splinter groups was not violent overthrow. Throughout the samples, there is repetition of words like "independent", "justice", "equality", "trade unions", and "strike", which carry tones of hope and firm beliefs. The rhetoric is unyielding, determined, and insistent, but it does not advocate for mass devastation in pursuit of the goal. In fact, the stated goal in most cases is not even to rid Poland of Communism – it is simply to have Solidarity recognized as a legitimate player in Polish politics. In many cases, the language even carries hints of sadness and exhaustion, such as "deception" or "waiting", reflecting the mood of the Polish people and their desire for change.

Perhaps what is most interesting about the Polish protests is how little was actually said against the Polish government or the Soviet Union. Looking at the posters, the rhetoric rarely takes on an angry tone. Almost none of it is directed at the state, and Communism is only mentioned overtly once. The rhetoric sounds like what it was – a political campaign for legitimacy from a people who were exhausted from decades of economic stagnation. It was only after the Polish government allowed Solidarity a spot on the ballot that the movement became associated with the end of Communist rule in

Poland. Peacefully and democratically, the rhetorical campaign of Solidarity was able to detach Poland from Moscow.

Part B: The Tunisian Protests, 2011

The spark that began the Arab Spring was not entirely dissimilar to the Polish protests in that it was driven by economic hardship. Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze on December 17, 2010 after his small vegetable cart was confiscated by local authorities, leaving Bouazizi with no employment alternatives. Unlike the Polish protests, though, social media turned Bouazizi into a revolutionary martyr instantly. From December 10th until Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (better known simply as “Ben Ali”) was deposed from office a mere four weeks later, the Tunisian Revolution burned bright, hot, and incredibly quickly.

Shortly after Bouazizi self-immolated, Time Magazine recorded sentiments from people around Bouazizi’s hometown of Sidi Bou Zid; one man said “We were silent before but Mohammed showed us that we must react,” while another explained “We are here because we want our dignity. We don't want to have to rely on political favors or bribes to get jobs; we need to clean out the system.”⁵⁵ The article also describes a group of young male protesters carrying signs that read “We are all prepared to sacrifice our blood for the people”⁵⁶. It is clear early on that most of the protesters shared Bouazizi’s frustration with the employment situation in Tunisia. The early rhetoric voices concern

⁵⁵ Rania Abouzeid, “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself On Fire”, *TIME Magazine Online*, January 21, 2011, Accessed October 23, 2012, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html>

⁵⁶ Ibid.

with economic disparity, high unemployment, and ultimately the government corruption that feeds the unemployment.

Looking at some of the signs and posters from the protests, it is evident that the rhetoric reflects anger and frustration. Much of the rhetoric is directed at Ben Ali personally; one young man holds a sign: “Have you ever seen a president who treats his people like idiots!!!” while another sign reads “You killed your people Ben Ali”. A phrase commonly seen again and again is the French phrase “Ben Ali Dégage” or “RCD Dégage” which means “Ben Ali Out” or “RCD Out”.⁵⁷ One woman holds a sign calling Ben Ali a “liar”. Other rhetoric simply conveys the general sentiment about life in Tunisia. There is a photo of students in a schoolyard, spelling out the Arabic phrase “No to Murder” with their bodies, while another group of protesters holds a sign reading “Halt the Repression in the Maghreb!”⁵⁸

While there were street protests almost daily, the majority of rhetoric was conveyed over the internet using platforms like Facebook or Twitter to rapidly spread messaging. Hundreds of people would tweet their feelings about what was happening in Tunisia, and the volume of Facebook and Twitter data available is almost impossible to analyze. By skimming the data, however, one can get a general sense of rhetorical trends that occurred. First, despite every user having the ability to broadcast his or her own thoughts, there are some users who quickly become influential and rise up as leaders. These users often tweeted or posted a message which was then re-tweeted or “liked” by

⁵⁷ RCD stands for “Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique”, or Constitutional Democratic Rally. This was the ruling party in Tunisia for over 55 years.

⁵⁸ Maghreb is a common term for the North West African region, to include Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, etc.

anywhere from dozens to hundreds of their followers, meaning that the vast majority of the internet was simply rehashing the same rhetoric over and over again. One example occurred on January 1, 2011 when user @TunisieLeveToi tweeted “La REVOLUTION DES JASMINs, tous UN RUBAN BLANC, il nous faut un symbole. Faites passez ! #Tunisia #SidiBouزيد” [Translated: The JASMINE REVOLUTION, all A WHITE RIBBON, we need a symbol. Let’s go! #Tunisia #SidiBouزيد]. The call for a unifying symbol was then retweeted over and over again, though it is unclear if this was ever adopted as a unifying slogan.⁵⁹

Second, these leaders were able to unify the masses using Twitter hashtags.⁶⁰ There is a sense of unity that helps gather people together for mass protests and acts as the glue to bring the various ideological factions together; The hashtags ‘#sidibouزيد’ and ‘#Tunisia’ quickly became the most utilized terms in the revolution, and were popular ways for citizens, journalists, ex-patriots, and activists to transmit their thoughts to anyone following those hashtags. ‘#Sidibouزيد’ alone received approximately 79,166 tweets, according to one archive, while a different analysis put the hashtag at no fewer than 103,000 tweets.⁶¹

⁵⁹ According to the Topsy.com archives, this was retweeted at least five more times, though odds are it was hundreds of times. Unfortunately, the twitter account for @TunisieLeveToi has been deactivated and it is difficult to retrieve accurate counts.

⁶⁰ A ‘hashtag’ is a word or phrase on Twitter following the ‘#’ symbol. Hashtags are used to categorize messages into easily searchable groups so the user can follow what is ‘trending’.

⁶¹ Deen Freelon, February 11, 2012, “Arab Spring Twitter data now available (sort of)”, *DFreelon.org*, Accessed October 9, 2012, <http://dfreelon.org/2012/02/11/arab-spring-twitter-data-now-available-sort-of/>; Alexia Tsotsis, January 16, 2011, "A Twitter Snapshot of the Tunisian Revolution: Over 196K Mentions of Tunisia, Reaching Over 26M Users." *Tech Crunch*, Accessed October 21, 2012. <http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/16/tunisia-2/>.

There was also unification in another sense. The term “solidarity” appears a number of times in Tunisian protest rhetoric. One Facebook post from the Tunisian political blog Nawaat jokingly said “[Ben Ali] created the National Solidarity fund...he took the cash and left us SOLIDARITY!”⁶² Another Twitter leader @Gamaleid rallied their followers by pleading “...emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow...”⁶³ It is unclear during this time period whether this was meant to be an homage to the Polish protest group, or simply a coincidental phrase to stir unity among the protesters.

Though the protesters may have been unified in spirit, they were certainly not unified in messaging. After reading through all the tweets and Facebook posts and blogs, it becomes very difficult to pick out any kind of common frame among all the noise. The sheer volume of information being flung around the ether begins to cancel itself out and the intended effect is lost. It seems that everyone wants the same outcome – the removal of the existing Tunisian government – but each person has their own personal reasons for why. There is little cohesion and therefore a very shaky frame with which to channel the rhetoric.

Despite the chaos emanating from hundreds of official or unofficial sources, the collaborating effect was immense. The Tunisian government heard the message loud and clear, and went on the record saying, “The message has been received by the government

⁶² Nawaat.org Facebook post, January 17, 2011, accessed March 15, 2014, <https://facebook.com/nawaat/posts/133683690028736?stream-ref=10>

⁶³ Archive of @Gamaleid Twitter post, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://topsy.com/trackback?url=http%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fgamaleid%2Fstatus%2F21165669177360384>

and all political channels. With the backing of the president, we have already put in place urgent measures and allocated \$5bn for the development of various areas.”⁶⁴ That statement was not enough to satiate protesters, though, because President Ben Ali resigned from office under duress four days later on January 14, 2011, leaving for exile with a promise to hold elections within six months.

Analysis of Rhetoric

Similarities

When one compares the events in Poland with those in Tunisia at face value, it would seem that the two have much in common. Both events feature countries suffering from similarly oppressive regimes. Economic conditions are dismal at best, and societal welfare is crumbling, so frustrated groups of people band together and stand up against their respective regimes.

The most notable similarity between the two revolutions is the ideology. The rhetoric from both the Polish and Tunisian protests reflect ideas of societal change and new government, though one was disputing the merits of Communism while the other, disparaging the heavy hand of dictatorship. The themes of oppression, economic disparity, economic and social freedom, and youthful generations longing for change are woven throughout both revolutionary periods, and serve as the foundation for protests.

Both groups also make use of one “martyr-figure” as a focus point for the larger protests. In Poland, that figure was Solidarity Chairman Lech Wałęsa while in Tunisia,

⁶⁴ Bilal Randeree, January 10, 2011, “Tunisia 'to respond' to protests”, *Al Jazeera.com*, Accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111109030302593.html>.

of course, it was Mohamed Bouazizi. These two men were the “face” of the protests – in spirit, if not in body – and both also were the reason the protests began in the first place. The similarities, though, essentially end here.

Differences

After a closer analysis, there are far more differences between the two political movements than similarities despite the fact that the end results were largely the same. First and most prominent, the rhetoric in Poland compared to Tunisian protests was exceptionally different. In 1989, the overwhelming message was of hope, solidarity, and democracy. And it was a peaceful, logical message: “Count on Me”, “We Demand Registration”, and “Free Elections” represent just some of the popular slogans seen repeatedly. There was no blatant animosity toward the existing leadership in a personal sense and the bloody rioting was kept to a minimum. None of the examples explicitly denounce the tenants of Communism or even call for regime change. They simply wish to bring the workers union to the forefront as a player in the existing government, and the ensuing economic turmoil caused by the strikes is the means by which that eventually happens.

In Tunisia, however, the tone was much more aggressive. Though Tunisia’s protests began as a reaction to economic injustices, the lack of unifying force meant that the messaging quickly spun out of control and was based primarily on emotional reactions as opposed to pragmatic justification. Much of the rhetoric is directed toward one singular leader rather than the government as a whole: “Ben Ali Out” and “You killed your people Ben Ali” were just two examples. And rather than calling for change or offering an alternative, the protesters merely berated the status quo. The Tunisian

government did not respond kindly to the angry mob and hundreds of people were injured or killed during the protests. Emotional rhetoric led to angry rebellion; angry rebellion begat a vicious cycle of violence which remains problematic to this day.

Another major difference lies in how the messaging was conveyed during the protest periods. Obviously modern technology was not available in 1989, meaning messaging was relegated to posters, newspapers, and pamphlets. Information was disseminated a great deal slower than in the modern day, though the benefit lay in how the message was shaped. Putting words to paper requires effort and consideration; one must carefully consider what to write and how those words might be perceived. If something is hastily written but overruled by one's peers, the poster can simply be left at home, the pamphlet not printed.

On the other hand, the rise of Twitter as a tool of rebellion was a phenomenon witnessed during the Arab Spring. Paper signs were rendered archaic as protesters could tweet their feelings in seconds. In some respects, Twitter, Facebook, and blogging allowed the Tunisian protesters to be connected to the cause in a larger way. People could hop onto their mobile phones or laptops and instantly become a part of history by using a hashtag. Anything they felt could be projected to the world just as fast as they could type it. Of course, this also comes with considerable drawbacks, which were made evident. The instantaneous nature of Twitter meant that raw emotion was flung into the ether with little regard for polishing. This often served to fan the flames of protest and encourage others to post similarly provocative things.

Another curiosity that rose from the Twitter trend was the "Rally 'round the hashtag" phenomenon. Rallying points are often used within protest groups to help call

the various factions to a common cause and focus the rhetorical message in order to achieve the objective more quickly. In Poland, the rally point manifested in nationalistic sentiment, using the flag as a symbol of unity. The whole point of the protest was to rescue their long-forgotten country from the Communist usurpers who had installed themselves a few decades previous. Tunisia also utilized their national flags as a rally point, though the overarching nationalist sentiment was less prominent; rather, people used Twitter hashtags as their call to action.

In truth, the hashtags provided the only source of unification in the protests. Unlike Solidarity which drove the messaging, no singular leader ever emerged in the Arab Spring in the same way as in Poland. There was no Solidarity movement to provide a source of direction and a common message which everyone could promulgate. Yet in Tunisia, the collective voice of hundreds of participants became the overwhelming factor. In the case of Tunisia, the rhetoric was more about quantity than quality.

Applying the Krebs-Jackson Formula

Based on the above rhetorical analysis, it is clear that the protest rhetoric had an impact on regime change in both 1988 and 2011; the question is to what extent. At first glance, the Polish protests seem to be a mission to oust the communist regime. After closer analysis, though, the protesters are really only calling for the inclusion of Solidarity. Solidarity and the protesters (C), argue that the Polish government (O) has been negligent in representing the voice of the people. The implication, then, is that the Polish government must allow Solidarity a seat on the ballot for upcoming elections.

The Polish government does indeed accept the implications of the argument and permits Solidarity a place on the 1989 election ballots, meaning Cases 3 and 4 are not the

outcome. The question is whether or not the Polish government accepted the frame that they were negligent in their representation of Polish citizens. It is difficult to know what was in the minds of the Polish government, but one recollection from Lech Wałęsa's firsthand account of one 1989 roundtable negotiation session provides some insight. At the close of an early April session, Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław Kiszczak addressed the cameras:

We have completed a truly collaborative piece of work. The experience was shared, and so should be the satisfaction. Speculation about who won and by how much, or who lost and by how much, is unproductive. There's been only one victor: our homeland...We have not worked in a vacuum nor behind closed doors. We have sought advice from society at large, we have listened to the voices of public opinion, we have read letters and telegrams from around the country. The future will reveal the practical, concrete results that come of these discussions. One thing is certain: they have already created precious political and moral capital, and have demonstrated once again that when confronted with serious problems, when their homeland needs them, Poles are able to rise above their divisions, their differences, and their prejudices.⁶⁵

From the Minister's words, it would appear that the government had heeded the protesters and realized that something had to give. Using this example as a gauge, it can be presumed that the Polish government did indeed realize that there had been some degree of neglect which roused the public to such fervent protests. By this metric, it is safe to say that Case 1 is the outcome of the Polish Solidarity movement.

⁶⁵ Lech Wałęsa, *The Struggle and the Triumph: An Autobiography*, (Paris: Editions Nathan, 1991): 180.

Table 5: Possible Results of Polish Protests

	<i>Accept Frame</i>	<i>Reject Frame</i>
<i>Accept Implications</i>	Case 1: Policy Change The Polish government accepts that they have been negligent and allow Solidarity a space on the ballot	Case 2: Mixed The Polish government does not accept that they have been negligent, but allow Solidarity a space on the ballot
<i>Reject Implications</i>	Case 3: Implication Contest The Polish government accepts that they have been negligent but do not allow Solidarity a space on the ballot	Case 4: Framing Contest The Polish government does not accept that they have been negligent and do not allow Solidarity a space on the ballot

The next step is to determine the outcome of the Tunisian protests. The lack of leadership and common rhetoric in Tunisia makes it very difficult to pinpoint the message “C” was trying to convey, (in fact, the analysis suggests that the protesters themselves were not entirely clear on their message either) which makes the Krebs-Jackson Formula all the more useful. After the analysis sorts through all the noise, the common frame that emerges is that Ben Ali’s regime (O) has been an oppressive force in Tunisia that is harmful to both person and economy. The implications, therefore, are that Ben Ali must go and a new government more focused on the needs of the people must be elected. Ben Ali was eventually forced to relinquish his post, fleeing into exile, and offered to host new elections in six months’ time.

In this case, it is difficult to say exactly which model best fits. Ben Ali's regime acknowledged that there were problems with the government, and were willing to concede to the demands of the protest groups. This rules out Case 2 and Case 4 since the Ben Ali regime accepted the frame. Originally, though, the government seemed to indicate that they would rather try to solve the problems with the existing government rather than allow a new government to form; this would mean that Case 3 is the outcome. Ben Ali was forced into exile before he could make good on his promise, which brought about instant regime change. Ultimately, there was complete policy change – for better or for worse – in Tunisia; since it was not due to the acquiescence of (O), however, this outcome is not counted as the result of protest rhetoric.

Table 6: Possible Results of Tunisian Protests

	<i>Accept Frame</i>	<i>Reject Frame</i>
<i>Accept Implications</i>	<p>Case 1: Policy Change</p> <p>Ben Ali's regime admits that they have been oppressive and Ben Ali allows a new government to form.</p>	<p>Case 2: Mixed</p> <p>Ben Ali's regime does not believe that they have been oppressive, but still allows a new government to form.</p>
<i>Reject Implications</i>	<p>Case 3: Implication Contest</p> <p>Ben Ali's regime admits that they have been oppressive, but does not allow a new government to form.</p>	<p>Case 4: Framing Contest</p> <p>Ben Ali's regime does not believe that they have been oppressive, and does not allow a new government to form.</p>

This case study is particularly fascinating since two similar circumstances with similar endings had different outcomes in the formula. The utility of the formula is proven as a way to dissect various scenarios and get to the root of how rhetoric actually impacts the intended audience.

Drawing Conclusions

In this example of a Bottom-Up scenario, two seemingly similar historical events are compared. The Polish revolutionaries of 1989 used particular rhetoric in order to persuade their Soviet-sympathizing government to accept the claim that Polish leadership had been negligent in their duty to the people of Poland. This is held in stark contrast to the Tunisian protesters in 2011, who attempted to employ rhetoric to unseat the alleged oppressive dictator, Ben Ali.

Answering the first question of C's success over O comes in two parts: in Part A, the answer is yes, the protesters (C) employed their rhetoric strategically to force the Polish government (O) into acquiescence. Their rhetoric was unified under the Solidarity movement, generally non-aggressive, and effective against a government that was quickly losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Part B, though, proves what happens when the rhetoric is not applied within the context of a coordinated frame. The Tunisian protesters did not have the same kind of leadership that Solidarity provided, and resulted in rhetoric that was sporadic, reactive, and often provoked violence. In Part B, the overall success of C against O is less easily discerned, as Ben Ali chose to resign before any real political change could occur.

It is evident that the Krebs-Jackson formula is very useful in analyzing a Bottom-Up scenario, to answer the second question. Citizen Claimants demanding policy change from Political Opponents is a common occurrence, and one which fits into the confines of the formula easily since in this scenario, O must be appropriately swayed in order to submit to C's demands. The formula allows us to categorize the frames and implications of C's argument, and select the particular 'corner' into which O was forced based on the

rhetoric C employs. For Chapter Two, it can be concluded that despite the varied success of the two samples, this was a successful application of the Krebs-Jackson formula.

CHAPTER THREE: RHETORIC OF THE RUN-UP: PRELUDE TO THE 2008 RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR (A PEER-TO-PEER CASE STUDY)

Since the beginning of recorded history, countries have been threatening to go to war with each other. In some cases those threats turn out to be legitimate, though much of the time the posturing and beating of chests is all for show. In the case of Russia and Georgia, the two countries have been locked in a precarious chess match for the better part of two centuries. Subtle and not-so-subtle messages are frequently battled across borders in order to make a point, yet rarely do the two actually come to blows. In 2008 however, the limits were tested and Russia eventually invaded the autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, land claimed as Georgian territory, resulting in a brief but intense war.

The final case study in this thesis analyzes the “rhetoric of the run-up” between Georgia and Russia in the months leading up to violence in 2008. Unlike the first two case studies, this case applies the Krebs-Jackson formula to rhetoric flung between governments, where the claimant (C) is Georgia, the opposition (O) is Russia, and the Western world serves as the Public (P). This case study is particularly interesting because of the important role played by ‘P’.

The relationship between Russia and its former satellite nations has been precarious since the Soviet Union broke apart in the late 1980s. Georgia’s visible shift to the Western world only adds to the provocation felt in Moscow, and exponentially increases the tension between the two countries. Historically, Georgia has always hoped the West would come to Georgia’s aid if Russia were to exercise any force in the region. In this case more than the other two, ‘C’ is hoping that its rhetoric will serve to change

the minds of ‘O’ with regard to Russia’s policy in the Autonomous territories, but also influence ‘P’ to provide a mitigating element.

Timeline of the Conflict

History of the Autonomous Territories

The argument over South Ossetia and Abkhazia goes back to the days of the former Soviet Union, when both territories were independent ethnic oblasts (regions) that were loosely connected to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). The autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia comprised approximately 22 percent of the Georgian SSR, however due to their historical independence, the populations of both territories identified themselves as Abkhazian and Ossetian first, not ethnic Georgian. The Georgians, though, very much considered South Ossetia and Abkhazia as part of their legitimate territory, and, according to the report issued by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (The Mission) on the Conflict in Georgia, the Georgian elite were “convinced that these entities had been created by the Soviet (Russian) central power to limit Georgian jurisdiction over its own territory.”⁶⁶

After the Soviet Union dissolved, Georgian nationalists proclaimed independence in 1991 and often used very ethno-centrist slogans which psychologically excluded the Abkhazian and Ossetian territories from the new independent Georgia. Meanwhile, Russia was seeking to reclaim control over its newly lost Republics and picked up support wherever it could be found. Not surprisingly, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were

⁶⁶ Council of the European Union, *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia: Volume I* (2009): 4.

feeling rather isolated from Georgia and began to align with Russian ideology. Forces from the Russian Federation began to intervene in conflicts between Georgia and the territories, fighting on the side of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁶⁷ One of the more significant conflicts occurred in 1991 between Georgia and South Ossetia, followed almost immediately by a second war between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1992. In June 1992, new Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to a cease-fire brokered by the Russians; as a result, “Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian ‘peacekeeping’ units set up base camps in a security zone around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia”.⁶⁸

The presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia has swayed public opinion in those regions in favor of Russia. However, Mikheil Saakashvili, elected President of Georgia in 2004, was decidedly anti-Russian in his ideology and was wary of the Russian presence and influence occupying what is legally Georgian territory. In fact, “under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Mikheil Saakashvili, bilateral relations became the most precarious ever between the Russian Federation and a neighboring state formerly belonging to the USSR.”⁶⁹ Saakashvili “reportedly sent several hundred police, military, and intelligence personnel into South Ossetia” under the pretense of bolstering its peacekeeping force in accordance with the guidelines set by the Sochi Agreements of 1992.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Council of the European Union, *Volume I*, (2009): 6

⁶⁸ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests*, by Jim Nichol, CRS Report RL34618, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, March 3, 2009): 2.

⁶⁹ Council of the European Union, *Volume I*, (2009): 7

⁷⁰ Library of Congress, *Russia-Georgia Conflict* (2009): 3

In 2005, Saakashvili attempted to placate South Ossetia with a new peace plan. The plan included “substantial autonomy and a three-stage settlement, consisting of demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and a political settlement”. However, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan outright, asserting that “we [South Ossetians] are citizens of Russia”⁷¹. It would seem that the stage was set for conflict.

The 2008 Russia-Georgia War

When the war kicked off in August 2008, the outside world was simultaneously surprised and unsurprised. As Brian Ellison notes, “There is some debate as to how the conflict began. Few now doubt that Georgia was responsible for actually initiating the war by attacking the city of Tskhinvali on the evening of August 7—but Russian presence in the region is thought to be at least a partial catalyst.”⁷²

In the report submitted by The Mission, all sides of the conflict – to include Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia – were asked to submit their version of events for consideration. Georgia claims that Russia launched “an egregious breach of Georgia’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity” when they sent mass troops into South Ossetia.⁷³ From the Russian angle, “the treacherous attack launched by Georgia against the peaceful population of South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeepers...demonstrated aggressive intent on the part of the Georgian side”.⁷⁴ This

⁷¹ Library of Congress, *Russia-Georgia Conflict* (2009), 3.

⁷² Brian Ellison, "Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 19 (2011): 343.

⁷³ Council of the European Union, *Volume II* (2009): 186.

⁷⁴ Council of the European Union, *Volume II* (2009): 188.

meant the Russians had no choice but to defend its peacekeepers and strike back against Georgian aggression.

Data Utilized

For this case study, the intent was to analyze rhetoric originating from heads of state in both Russia and Georgia. Wherever possible, firsthand accounts directly from the archives of Government Ministries (Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, Office of the President, etc.) are used. Official statements from the various ministries are not included in the analysis, as they represent a collective sentiment rather than the words of one particular individual. Since the conflict has arguably been ongoing since the early 20th century, narrowing the timeframe was important to gathering the most pertinent and pointed rhetoric applicable to the mounting tensions; therefore, analysis begins in January 2008 and ends on 7 August 2008, just before the Georgians fired shots at the Russian peacekeeping forces.

Since the public also plays a critical role, finding accounts of speeches or remarks that appeared in widely-accessible settings – such as national speeches, remarks given at public events, or newspaper interviews – was central to the overall analysis. In the instances when information came from quotes found in news articles, no journalistic interpretation was applied – strictly the verbatim quote from the government official.

This case study was different in that there was an actual dialogue played out before the public between the two opposing parties. In the first two case studies, the rhetoric from ‘C’ was almost entirely one sided; a verdict from ‘O’ was not fully established until the end of the case study, whereas with this case study, ‘C’ and ‘O’ are closely linked and the rhetoric goes back and forth to develop the relationship. In some

instances, the two leaders are even in the same room together. This provides an interesting dynamic which will develop further in the analysis.

Much like Case Study 1, the various speeches were combed for rhetoric which was intended for either the opposition or public consumption, and each instance was color coded based on the sentiment evoked by each passage (red for aggressive/negative, green for sentimental/positive, orange for neutral).

Table 7: Number of Positive, Negative, and Neutral References from Georgian and Russian speeches (January – July 2008)						
GEORGIA	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	July
Positive	13	3	63	8	2	17
Negative	4	7	71	31	7	28
Neutral	0	0	0	1	0	0
RUSSIA	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	July
Positive	14	1	8	0	23	0
Negative	1	10	0	0	1	0
Neutral	0	0	0	0	0	0

Factors to Consider

The history of Russia-Georgia relations goes back centuries and is interspersed with periods of both harmony and hostility. In recent decades, the influence of the West has added a third dynamic to the precarious relationship in varying attempts to curtail Russia's grasp on the region. Naturally, when any kind of trouble begins to brew in the Caucasus region, the entire world attempts to weigh in and convince Russian leadership to stand down. When conducting this Case Study, the influence of the West cannot be overlooked. Any result is likely due in part to behind-the-scenes diplomacy and backchannel negotiations orchestrated with great delicacy. However, as with the Case

Study in Chapter Two, it is impossible to know and account for these cloaked interactions. Therefore, this Case Study is only interested in the reactions that are given in response to public remarks.

It is also important to note that this Case Study involves the particular personalities of the leaders more directly than the previous Case Studies. Russia's Vladimir Putin is a force of nature, a shrewd politician and former espionage master who is known to "play the long game" when it comes to geopolitics. This is contrasted sharply by Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, a young, fiery, and volatile leader lacking both the political acumen and the patience of his Russian counterpart. Their respective personalities and leadership styles directly influence the type of rhetoric lobbed across their shared border, as well as any response (or lack thereof).

February – March 2008

When speaking to the world about the actions of the Russians, Georgia certainly felt no need to hold back. As evidenced in Table 7 above, the rhetoric coming from the Georgian side was generally negative, with only one instance where a remark could be perceived as neutral.

There was no data available for the entire month of January; that is to say, searching through the archives resulted in no transcripts or news articles that featured direct quotes from the Georgian Prime Minister or President regarding the situation in the autonomous territories. Thus, the analysis begins in February with an article from Civil.ge and an account of a meeting between Mr. Saakashvili and Mr. Putin. When speaking to his home country newspaper, Saakashvili naturally uses very aggressive rhetoric to prove to his home countrymen that he will not tolerate being pushed around by

the Russians. Terms like “manipulation” and “serious and dangerous” were used, as well as the phrase “do not play with fire”⁷⁵. When speaking in an official state capacity, however, Saakashvili completely kowtows to Putin and does not use rhetoric that could possibly be misconstrued as improper or hostile.

Russian rhetoric is very even-toned at this stage, and some phrases even suggest friendship. Rhetoric in February comes from two state visits with the Georgian head of state, and Putin says that “relations are starting to improve” and that he is “pleased to hear” that “Georgian leadership seeks better relations with Russia”. One week later, Russian rhetoric is very humble and insistent that “we never shy away” from discussing sensitive issues with “partners”.

February would be the last time such pristine language was used. By March, the pattern of rhetoric from Georgian leadership was quickly trending toward aggressive, with terms like “dangerous”, “illegal”, “self-destruction” being repeated many times. When the rhetoric softens, it is usually the Georgian leadership reassuring the Georgian people (and presumably the Western world) that Georgia is “calm” and “undefeatable when united”. Likewise, Russian rhetoric takes a turn for the negative when Putin is asked about Georgia’s possible entry into the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Putin immediately grows defensive, and begins to describe the alliance as “unnecessary”, “harmful” and “counterproductive”, as well as increasing the “potential

⁷⁵ The color coded dataset used for the analysis, and the list of sources from which the selections were drawn, can be found in Appendix F.

for conflict”. A few weeks later, Putin voices his concern about the same subject saying “we are not happy about the situation” and calling it “troublesome”.

April – May 2008

In April the conflict begins to heat up quickly, and Georgian rhetoric becomes even more antagonistic toward the Russians. On April 20th, Georgia accused the Russians of shooting down an unmanned aircraft in Georgian airspace, giving Georgia plenty of fuel for a campaign of hostile rhetoric. The term “unprovoked” is used frequently to describe the attack, and the Georgians often project onto Russia the severity of their actions, claiming that “this is not only illegal”, but “total craziness”. On April 24th, Saakashvili addressed the entire nation in a lengthy speech devoted to cutting down the Russians and defending Georgian integrity. He mentions “worrisome events”, a “serious security situation” that “threatens the nation’s security”. Saakashvili describes the Russians as “increasingly provocative”, who through their “act of armed aggression”, “attacked and destroyed” Georgian property. Variations of “aggression” are used three times in the speech, and the word “illegal” appears four times. Even when using friendlier terms, Saakashvili still manages to turn Russia into the scapegoat. Saakashvili describes Georgia as “committed to integrity” and “united as Georgians”, “patient and steadfast” and “moving toward greater freedom”. Georgia is obviously painted as a victim, while the evil, antagonistic Russia stomps all over the international laws which dictate Georgian territory.

Russian rhetoric in April starts out very cool. In stark contrast to Saakashvili’s accusations of illegality, Putin insists that Russia is “entirely in the legal domain” and just trying to protect the “legal interests” of Russia’s citizens. Then the incident with the

downed aircraft emerges in mid-April. Rather than lash back at the rhetoric being spewed from Tbilisi, however, Russian leadership goes completely silent. A number of statements were put out by either the Russian Foreign Ministry or the Russian Defense ministry, and sometimes those statements included references to things that Putin or Medvedev had said. But since there is no direct transcript of remarks available from the leadership, these accounts cannot be included in the data set.

By May, Saakashvili's rhetoric has become almost entirely negative in tone, and he has essentially given up on the "calmer" Georgia. An interview with Reuters on May 1, 2008 recorded Saakashvili as mocking Russia's fear of the "dangerous virus of democracy and freedom" and "perceived threat" of NATO enlargement. Speeches throughout the rest of May are equally hostile, evident by the large amounts of red coloring in the coding charts in Appendix D. He reminds his audience that "this threat remains" and things are "still very tense". He describes the situation as "very volatile", "extremely unstable" and a "very unclear period". Yet despite the "threats of direct action" and "further aggression by Russia", Saakashvili describes Georgia as a "moderating force" who would be "crazy to consider a military option", though he warns that "we have decided not to give back Abkhazia" because "that is basically called appeasement". Putin, in contrast, has gone silent.

June-July 2008

In June and July the pressure begins to boil over. There is increased use of the term "illegal" and Saakashvili calls the Russians "gangs of bandits" three times in one speech. He takes on a tone of incredulity, using phrases like "don't recall anything as wild as this" or "God knows what reason", and "normal air forces don't do these kind of

things”. There is much repetition of the terms “blatant”, “unprecedented”, “illegal”, and “surprise”. At the same time, keeping with the theme of Georgia as a victim, he insists that Georgia “cannot fight with Russia”, and are “willing to work closely” with Russia for peace. He describes Georgia as a “small country” with “morality” and “strong emotional, cultural, and historic ties”, clearly trying to point the public – and the Kremlin – to the fact that meek Georgia is being bullied.

Putin does not make any public remarks in June; rather, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev makes public remarks on two occasions that can be included into the dataset. On June 21st, Medvedev is at St. Petersburg University speaking with students. During the question and answer session, one student asks outright about the recent provocative acts on the border. Medvedev responds that Russia is a “peace-loving” country, bound to Georgia through “historical, cultural, and state ties”. He describes Georgia as “a country very close to us” with “differences of opinion” that can be settled through “bilateral negotiation”. Medvedev mentions the idea of peaceful discussion a few times, indicating that Russia is willing to negotiate with “appropriate representatives”. He refers to the Russian “peacekeepers” and their mission “in accordance with an international agreement” who operate “worthily and responsibly”. He concludes by chastising the student for drawing “the kinds of conclusions you suggested” about Russia’s intervention in the region.

After July 15th, the leaders from both sides go silent; at least, it was impossible to locate sources with direct quotes from either Russian or Georgian heads of state commenting on the simmering conflict. Perhaps that was the calm before the storm,

because on August 7 2008, Georgian troops fired on Russian troops and the five-day war kicked off.

Analysis of Rhetoric

This case is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First, what was originally thought to be a two-sided conversation quickly revealed itself to be largely one-sided. The chart in Appendix F provides a useful visual to compare the incredible volume of rhetoric from Georgia compared to Russia. While the Georgians are constantly saturating the public media with their accounting of events, the Russians sit in relative silence.

Second, Georgia proved to be very forthright with their aggressive rhetoric. In a number of instances, Saakashvili does not hesitate to point a finger directly at Moscow, citing “Russian aggression” or “Russian support” or even “President Putin”. Anytime there was positive rhetoric, it was only to further support the narrative that Russia was a bully trying to push around their former satellite nation, or to paint Georgia as a moderate force for good. Unless the two parties were sharing a microphone in the same room, Georgia never spoke kind words of Russia. It would seem obvious that the Claimant tries to push their side of the argument, however by constantly banging the drum of injustice and victimization, the rhetoric begins to lose its effectiveness, particularly as Georgia was not an entirely innocent party when it came to provocative acts of aggression within the Autonomous region itself.

Finally, it was a bit surprising how the Russians refrained from commenting. In many ways, the lack of rhetoric from the Russians served only to discredit the rhetoric flowing from Tbilisi, which began to sound a bit whiny. By choosing to speak at select

moments, and employ primarily positive rhetoric, the Russians painted themselves as amenable people caught in a minor disagreement.

Furthermore, the fact that this exchange transpired on the public stage – sometimes alongside of Western representatives – seemed to have no impact on Russia at all. Georgia’s perpetual shrieks of injustice were not enough to persuade the West to intervene, nor even enough to rile the Russian bear. In the end, Georgia’s rhetoric fell on deaf ears around the world.

Applying the Krebs-Jackson Formula

Looking at all the available data, we can determine the outcome of Georgia’s efforts. Cases 1 and 3 are automatically ruled out by Russia flatly denying the notion that their behavior was overly aggressive or hostile. Case 2 could have been the outcome if the Russians had disagreed that their actions were provocative – only acting out of concern for the Russian citizens in the Autonomous Territories – but agreed to remove their peacekeeping troops. However, Russia repeatedly insisted that the peacekeepers were in the territories in accordance with the international treaties, and thus they were completely legal.

Therefore, it is clear that the outcome is Case 4: Framing Contest. For all its bravado, the Georgian (C) frame of the Russians as a bully was ignored, their indignation drowned by the silence of Russia (O). Nothing Saakashvili said could persuade Putin to accept Georgia’s Implication that Russia needed to stand down, nor was he able to persuade the Western nations (P) to come to Georgia’s aid.

Table 8: Possible Results of Case Study 3

	<i>Accept Frame</i>	<i>Reject Frame</i>
<i>Accept Implications</i>	<p>Case 1: Policy Change</p> <p>The Russians accept Georgia's claim that the Russians are overly aggressive and agree to surrender the Autonomous Territories.</p>	<p>Case 2: Mixed</p> <p>The Russians do not accept Georgia's claim that the Russians are overly aggressive but agree to surrender the Autonomous Territories</p>
<i>Reject Implications</i>	<p>Case 3: Implication Contest</p> <p>The Russians accept Georgia's claim that the Russians are overly aggressive, however they do not abandon the Autonomous Territories</p>	<p>Case 4: Framing Contest</p> <p>The Russians do not accept Georgia's claim that the Russians are overly aggressive and do not abandon the Autonomous Territories</p>

Drawing Conclusions

This final case study focuses on the Peer-to-Peer scenario, when one Claimant politician attempts to force an Opposition politician into a particular frame and implications. As evidenced by the analysis, Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili was unable to publically force Vladimir Putin into changing Russia's policy on the autonomous territories, which is the answer to the first question of C's overall success or failure in this case. It is interesting to see that although Saakashvili set forth a clear frame and implications, the missing factor was acceptance from the Russians. This case study proves the point that even the most convincing frame and earnest implications may not be enough to sway the target audience if the political pressure from C is not viewed as 'problematic' in the first place. This is in stark contrast to the case study used in the original Krebs-Jackson paper, where the Israeli government clearly felt pressured by the Druze implying that the Israelis were anything other than ethnically tolerant.

Saakashvili's rhetorical blasts were unable to back Putin and the Russians into the desired corner, which is not surprising given Putin's reputation for stoicism.

Addressing the second question, this does appear to be an appropriate and useful application of the Krebs-Jackson formula. The public arena is a common forum for leaders to play out political disputes while simultaneously garnering support from allies. Even when shrouded by cordial overtones, rhetoric directed between leaders carries direct implications intended to back the Opposition into a corner and sway opinion toward the Claimant. Depending on the scenario and personalities of the leadership involved, this very public display of coercive rhetoric could be enough to force the Opposition into a policy change. In this particular case, though, Putin won the battle of attrition.

CONCLUSION

Political rhetoric is nothing if not calculated. Politicians and groups seeking political change spend a great deal of time attempting to bring their target audience around to their point of view; the question is, does all that rhetorical showiness work? As was presented in this essay, the Krebs-Jackson formula is an important tool because it helps crystalize what – if any – impact that rhetoric had on forcing policy change in O. When trying to analyze the overall impact a Claimant’s rhetoric has on his Opposition, there is much that can get lost in translation. By breaking down the possible outcomes into four categories, and viewing the rhetoric in terms of frames and implications, we can better organize the chaos and ambiguity of political rhetoric, and assign a more accurate outcome.

Table 9: Summary of Krebs-Jackson Case Study Results

Case Study	Type	Outcome	Appropriate Use of Formula?
1: Rhetoric of Foreign Policy	Top-Down	Case 3: Implications Contest	No
2A: Rhetoric of Protest (Poland)	Bottom-Up	Case 1: Policy Change	Yes
2B: Rhetoric of Protest (Tunisia)	Bottom-Up	Case 3: Implications Contest	Yes
3: Rhetoric of the Run Up	Peer-to-Peer	Case 4: Framing Contest	Yes

In Chapter One, the formula is useful in discerning exactly what the polling data told us about American public opinion toward the Soviet Union. Public opinion ebbed and flowed so often that it was easy to lose sight of the bigger picture. The Krebs-Jackson formula revealed that ultimately, the American public agreed with President Reagan’s rhetorical frame that the Soviet Union was trying to change its ways, however

they were hesitant to accept the implication that the United States would enter into a new relationship with the Soviets. In other words, the rhetoric President Reagan used did impact the American people, but only to a certain extent. It was also revealed that this type of “Top-Down” scenario may not be the best application of the Krebs-Jackson formula, as it ultimately does not matter what the public thinks about any particular policy. Favorable public opinion always makes it much easier for a politician to work and unfavorable public opinion can make for a hostile operating environment or even ultimately lead to policy reversals. But if a politician really wants to change policy, the public has little control over that in the immediate sense.

Chapter Two may have been the most informative of the three. It first revealed that collective rhetoric does not necessarily lend itself to an obvious frame. In Part A, Solidarity in Poland, the clear organization and deliberate rhetoric of the campaign had a great impact on winning the battle for legitimization with little backlash. In Part B, Tunisia, by contrast, there was a great deal of emotional rhetoric but little by way of driving force to unify that rhetoric into a frame. When the Krebs-Jackson formula was applied to Part B, it was difficult to determine exactly what C’s frame was, and thereby difficult to determine the ultimate outcome. This case study also showed that rhetoric alone, without the frame and subsequent implications, is just noise.

In many ways, Chapter Two was the most similar to the original Krebs-Jackson case study in their essay. This was a “Bottom-Up” case where the citizens used rhetoric in the public forum to pressure their governments into policy change. This is an ideal application of the formula, as it measures the government’s reaction to the rhetoric

employed. In Part A, this resulted in a total policy shift, whereas in Part B, the best conclusion was an Implications Contest.

The final case study in Chapter Three had the clearest outcome, but it also had interesting results. This case study showed that although rhetoric can be forced into a frame and subsequent implications, but it may not be enough to turn the tides. For all of Saakashvili's bravado and banging of the proverbial table, he was unable to achieve the desired results with his frame or his implications. The public played a critical role in this case study, but they too were clearly not swayed by the frame by which Saakashvili delivered his rhetoric. However, this is still a relevant application of the formula. Governments frequently use the global platform to voice consent or dissent with the actions of other governments. The Krebs-Jackson formula measures whether or not a Claimant government's rhetoric is successful in causing enough public ruckus to force the Opposition government into submission.

Interestingly, Case 2 (Mixed) never appeared as one of the outcomes. Case 2 is probably one of the least likely to occur in modern political situations due to the fact that it requires O to disagree with C on principle, but acquiesce to C's demands anyway. Perhaps in other political eras this would have been a more frequent outcome as political groups seemingly had a greater tolerance for negation in the pursuit of progress. Today's political groups rarely compromise principle (whether justified or not).

The question still to be answered is whether or not political Claimants seeking change should bother with devising great rhetorical arguments in the hope of persuading the Opposition over to their side. Unfortunately, in this essay, the results are inconclusive. In only one of the four scenarios did the Claimant successfully achieve the

desired result from the Opposition; one scenario ended in flat out failure, while two more were impacted by external factors which meant the model could not form an accurate result. Despite the inconsistency, we can still draw conclusions about the general effectiveness of rhetoric from Claimant to Opposition based on the outcomes of each Case Study, as listed in Table 10 below. The Bottom-Up scenario is listed as Most Effective as this was the only Case Study which showed moderate success. The Polish Solidarity movement was completely successful in employing persuasive rhetoric over their Opposition, and the Tunisian protesters may have been successful if external factors had not intervened and essentially halted the model before the full effect of protest rhetoric could be realized.

Table 10: Ranking Effectiveness of Rhetoric by Scenario

Scenario	Ranking
Bottom-Up	(1) Most Effective
Top-Down	(2) Somewhat Effective
Peer-to-Peer	(3) Least Effective

Top-Down is ranked as Somewhat Effective based on the outcome of Reagan's rhetoric toward the American people. Reagan experienced some success in garnering a reaction from the public, however it is much more difficult to convince an entire populace to accept a policy change. There are too many variables involved with a Top-Down scenario to draw a definitive conclusion about the effectiveness of C's rhetoric. And finally, Peer-to-Peer is ranked Least Effective scenario for political persuasive rhetoric. In Chapter Three, Saakashvili was wholly unsuccessful in his attempts to persuade Putin to rethink Russia's policy regarding the Autonomous Territories. Peer-to-Peer rhetoric is the most difficult to employ as it depends largely on the personalities of

the two political entities involved. As evidenced in the Putin/Saakashvili case, Putin's stoic temperament meant that all the rhetoric in the world from Saakashvili's could not force Putin into any kind of compromise. Other, weaker politicians may be more easily influenced by Claimant rhetoric; however, this could not be tested within the confines of this particular essay.

From these rankings, Political Claimants can assess which scenario they are about to enter into, and decide whether or not it is worth spending significant amounts of time tailoring rhetoric for the Opposition audience. Yet it must be re-emphasized, as Krebs and Jackson originally told us, that the formula cannot read hearts or minds. Ultimately, the way people respond to rhetoric depends on their own personal interpretation, their past experiences, and their perspective on the issue. Overcoming this bias is nearly impossible, but the formula goes a long way in distilling the root of the arguments and isolating the audience's response. Thus, a politician can estimate the various arguments and responses in advance, and possibly tailor his rhetoric so as to have the greatest chance of achieving the desired outcome.

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
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Appendix A: Public Opinion Polling Data (1982-1988)

Trending Public Opinion Polling Data: 1982-1988

Month	Year	% Favorable (subtotal)	% Unfavorable (subtotal)	Poll Source
Jan	1980	14	84	Gallup
Jan	1981	20	77	Gallup
Jan	1982	23	77	NORC-GSS
Jan	1983	15	83	Gallup/NORC-GSS Average
Jan	1985	23	77	NORC-GSS
Jan	1986	34	66	NORC-GSS
May	1987	25	71	Times Mirror
Jan	1988	38	62	Times Mirror/NORC-GSS Average



Appendix B: State of the Union Speech Coding

1982		1983	
Soviet regime behind that military dictatorship	must be a real incentive for the Soviets to take these talks seriously	strategy for peace is our relationship with the Soviet Union	responsible members do not threaten or invade neighbors
forces of oppression	moderation of Soviet power	change in Soviet leadership	they restrain allies from aggression
working for reduction of arms	of restraint and accommodation	prepared for a positive change in relations	pursuing arms reduction negotiations
far-reaching agenda for mutual reduction	Soviets engaged in an unrelenting buildup	SU must show by deeds as well as words	overwhelming evidence of Soviet violations of international treaties
already initiated negotiations	Soviet empire	sincere commitment to respect the rights and sovereignty of nations	
we negotiate from a position of strength	they respect only strength and resolve		
	we've never needed walls or minefields or barbed wire		

1984		1985	
more stable basis for peaceful relations with the Soviet Union	People of the Soviet	committed to seeking fair and verifiable arms agreements	Soviet-supported aggression
I want to speak to the people of the Soviet Union	Eisenhower, who fought by your side in WWII	influenced the Soviet Union to return to the bargaining table	with full Cuban-Soviet bloc support
our sons and daughters have never fought each other in war	If your government wants peace , there will be peace	Soviets will build a defense system of their own	provides bases for Communist terrorists
People of the Soviet Union	We can come together in faith and friendship	they already have strategic defenses that surpass ours	
there is only one sane policy for your country and mine	build a safer and far better world for our children and our children's children		
to preserve our civilization			

Appendix B

1986	1987		1988
threat from Soviet forces	Soviets have invested \$500 billion more on their military forces	when Mr. Gorbachev was here	when Mr. Gorbachev was here
Soviet drive for domination	nearly 1 in 3 Soviet families is without running hot water	all Soviet troops are removed	all Soviet troops are removed
increase in espionage and state terror	government still found the resources to transfer \$75 billion in weapons to client states	made my views known to Mr. Gorbachev	made my views known to Mr. Gorbachev
It is my hope that our fireside summit in Geneva	can anyone still doubt their single-minded determination to expand their power	reduce US and Soviet long-range missiles	reduce US and Soviet long-range missiles
Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to America	it continues a brutal war	never risk our security just for an agreement	never risk our security just for an agreement
more stable relationship	props up a regime whose days are clearly numbered	progress in real respect for human rights	
openly proclaims and practices an alleged right to command people's lives	guarantees the rapid withdrawal of all Soviet troops	more open contacts between our societies	
export its ideology by force	they sought to cripple our strategic defense initiative	one moment of opportunity that the Soviets dashed	
have made clear that Soviet compliance with the letter and spirit of agreements is essential			
If the Soviet Government wants an agreement, there will be such an agreement			

Appendix C: Polish Protests

Poland




Source: <http://www.solidarnosc.gov.pl/gallery/gazeta/05/1-4%20MSZ.JPG>




Source: <http://www.solidarnosc.gov.pl/index.php?document=59>

Poland



**“We ask for registration of
Solidarity”**

Source: <http://cultureofdissent.tumblr.com/#15256074710>




**We demand immediate
registration of NZS without
changes in the statute**

(Note: NZS - Niezależne Zrzeszenie
Studentów

Independent Students' Association)


Poland



**“The Communist Party?
No, thank you”**

**“Your vote for Solidarity is a step
toward freedom**

**MAŁOPOLSKIE Citizens'
Committee”**



Poland

WHAT ARE WE WAITING FOR?

If you would still have to be as it is, you are lost


Your friend is a change

The partner of your fight is disagreement.

You have to do something from nothing, and what
is powerful should go for nothing

What you have, you will waive.

AND YOU WILL TAKE WHAT HAS BEEN
DENIED TO YOU



Poland



Stanowimy organizację

SOLIDARNOŚĆ WALCZĄCA

Naszą dewizą: „wolni i solidarni”.
Wyrośliśmy z powszechnego ruchu
społeczno – wyzwolenieckiego,
z NSZZ „Solidarność”/.../. Zmieramy do
niepodległej, demokratycznej Polski.
Dążymy do wyzwolenia narodów
z łańcuchów komunizmu.

SOLIDARNOŚĆ WALCZĄCA

We are the organization

“Fighting Solidarity”

Our motto: "free and solidarity"

We have grown up with a widespread social and
liberation movement under "Solidarity"

We are heading to independent and democratic
Poland.

We strive to free nations from the shackles of
communism.

**SOLIDARNOŚĆ
WALCZĄCA**

ZAPROSZENIE

NA MAN
POD HAS
Z
WOLN

1 MAJA
PLAC KO

Fighting Solidarity

Invites

For Manifestation


Under the slogan:

“We Demand Free Elections”

1 May 9:00 hour

Constitution Square

Poland



We Revenge Rulewski

(Note: Refers to a Polish politician and activist of Solidarity, Jan Rulewski. He was assaulted by police during the Bydgoszcz events in 1981.

Provocation!

On March 19th in the building of WRN in Bydgoszcz several hundred militiamen assaulted councilors and representatives

of Solidarity

25 injured –among them are councilors

Solidarity Trade Union Chairman Jan Rulewski

IN SERIOUS CONDITION

Solidarity announces readiness to strike across the country

Lech Wałęsa in Bydgoszcz

ENOUGH LAWLESSNESS!

OWOKACJA!

achu WRN w Bydgoszczy KILKuset MILICJANTÓW

atakowało radnych
stawicieli »Solidarności

annych — są wśród nich radni!

acy MKZ NSZZ Solidarność Jan Rulewski

/ STANIE CIĘŻKIM

ogłasza gotowość strajkową w całym kraju!

Lech Wałęsa w Bydgoszczy

DOŚĆ BEZPRAWIA!



Appendix D: Tunisian Protests

Tunisia



<http://totallycoolpix.com/2011/01/the-tunisian-revolution/>



<http://www.nationalturk.com/en/tunisian-protest-governments-video-2401>

Tunisia



“Ben Ali Get Out”

<http://www.dawn.com/news/598896/protests-force-tunisian-president-out-of-power>



“Ben Ali Get Out”

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tunisia_Unrest_-_VOA_-_Tunis_14_Jan_2011_\(3\).jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tunisia_Unrest_-_VOA_-_Tunis_14_Jan_2011_(3).jpg)

Tunisia



“Ben Ali Get Out”

<http://totallycoolpix.com/2011/01/the-tunisian-revolution/>



<https://twitter.com/ForJustice/status/25508084730302465>

Tunisia

Despite all the sadness on the blood of the Egyptians in Alexandria, emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow 17:00 Bataat war, followers please RT # sidibouزيد

twitter.com/gamaleid/status/21165669177360384

All Tweets 10

Influential Only 5

Filter

Filter



une marocaine @ Unemarocaine **Highly Influential**

RT @ Gamaleid : Despite all the sadness on the blood of the Egyptians in Alexandria, emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow 17:00 Bataat war, please followers RT ...

3 years ago Reply Retweet Favorite



ana heya @ Guelga

RT @ Gamaleid : Despite all the sadness on the blood of the Egyptians in Alexandria, emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow 17:00 Bataat war, please followers RT ...

3 years ago Reply Retweet Favorite



lina ben Mhenni @ Benmhennilina **Highly Influential**

RT @ Gamaleid : Despite all the sadness on the blood of the Egyptians in Alexandria, emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow 17:00 Bataat war, please followers RT ...

3 years ago Reply Retweet Favorite



Hatem Meddeb @ Hatemmw **Influential**

@ Gamaleid thankfully, our hearts with you

3 years ago Reply Retweet Favorite



Malek owner @ maliikt

RT @ Gamaleid : Despite all the sadness on the blood of the Egyptians in Alexandria, emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow 17:00 Bataat war, please followers RT ...

3 years ago Reply Retweet Favorite



Slim Amamou @ Slim404 **Highly Influential**

RT @ Gamaleid : Despite all the sadness on the blood of the Egyptians in Alexandria, emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow 17:00 Bataat war, please followers RT ...

3 years ago Reply Retweet Favorite




Jakki @ Tunizinno

RT @ Gamaleid : Despite all the sadness on the blood of the Egyptians in Alexandria, emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the Tunisian people tomorrow 17:00 Bataat war, please followers RT ...

3 years ago Reply Retweet Favorite

<http://topsy.com/trackback?url=http%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fgamaleid%2Fstatus%2F21165669177360384>

Tunisia



<http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/23/idINIndia-54334620110123>

Tunisia



<http://socialcapital.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/tunisia-cc-marcovdz.jpg>




<https://twitter.com/TunisiaTrends/status/24423110417584129>

Tunisia




<https://twitter.com/ramseygeorge/status/24423671086981120>



http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/tunisians-document-protests-online/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

Appendix E: Visual Depiction of Russian & Georgian Rhetoric



Appendix F: Russian and Georgian Speech Coding

Georgian Rhetoric

February 17, 2008	February 21, 2008	March 6, 2008	March 8, 2008
“Tbilisi Warns of ‘Dangerous Impasse’ in Ties with Russia” <i>Civil.ge</i>	Meeting with President of Georgia (Joint Event) <i>Kremlin Transcript Archive</i>	“Georgia: Tbilisi starts to feel the backlash of Kosovo independence” <i>Georgiandaily.com</i> “Georgian Breakaway Region Seeks U.N. Recognition” <i>NY Sun</i>	“Saakashvili Calls for Unity” <i>Civil.ge</i>
manipulation	I am very happy	any support of separatism from a neighboring state is illegal	extremely provocative and dangerous step
serious and dangerous deadlock	I did not want to miss	This is a dangerous decision	I repeat that this is a very dangerous move
do not play with fire	I invite you	mark the start of Russia’s own self-destruction	Georgia’s response should be calm
	We would be very pleased	Russia can't recognize their independence	Georgia does not want war, Georgia does not want violence
	We have indeed had some good meetings		provocative, dangerous act of Russia's
	we are also making progress		Georgia is undefeatable when it is united on key issues
	We simply must normalise our relations		
	Overcome past problems		
	we hope		
	restore positive trend		
	give new impetus to our relations		
	something we all desire		
	hope very much		

April 17, 2008	April 21, 2008	April 22, 2008	April 23, 2008
<p>“‘Revise Decision’ – Saakashvili Tells Moscow”</p> <p>“Saakashvili on Russia’s Abkhaz, S.Ossetian Move” <i>Civil.Ge</i></p>	<p>“Georgian Leader Says He Has ‘Proof’ of Russian Attack” <i>Bloomberg</i></p>	<p>“Georgia Russia Tension Escalates over Downed Drone” <i>New York Times</i></p>	<p>‘Russia Wants to Annex Abkhazia’ – Saakashvili <i>Civil.ge</i></p>
it was a provocative Russian move	attacked an unmanned Georgian plane	unprovoked aggression	will summon tomorrow
Georgia’s peace plan, its territorial integrity and the inviolability of our borders	Russia carried out this aggressive attack		it no longer recognized Georgia’s sovereignty
Nothing will hamper the process of the peaceful unification of our country	deliberate disinformation		I hope they realize
We demand that the Russian Federation revise all those decisions			that this is not only illegal
peaceful unification of Georgia			total craziness
We are ready to hold consultations			risky for Russia itself
astonished and anxious			Russia has declared it clearly
we should remain patient and resolute			they in general recognize Georgia's territorial integrity
provocative nature of Russia’s move			they do not recognize our sovereignty
			Russia wants annexation

April 24, 2008			
“Georgia’s Values of Democracy, Freedom and Dignity are Under Attack from Russia: Pres. Saakashvili” <i>Georgian Daily</i>			
worrisome events	reject Georgia’s jurisdiction	peaceful, democratic values	undermine the values of peace, democracy, and freedom
pushed away	diplomatic recognition to these territories	reverse Russia’s pattern	put our democratic values on display
serious security situation	as if they were separate nations	aggressive and irresponsible actions	cannot be deterred from our freedoms
refuse to move even a single inch	act of armed aggression	sovereign nation	economic and social improvements
threaten nation’s security	illegally took off	will not rule out any action	we are committed to the integrity
ensure our security	attacked and destroyed	direct and difficult conversation with President Putin	we are all united as Georgians
sovereign, peaceful, democratic state	unpiloted Georgian police plane	he was unable or unwilling	ensure that we all stand together
ensure a peaceful, prosperous life	disturbingly renew a pattern	explain our grave concern	threat to our national unity
worked to improve our relations	Russian aggression	review these actions by Russia	remain patient and steadfast
built modern military	Russian support for ethnic cleansing	protect our sovereignty and security	reflect on the resurrection our own country has achieved
strengthened ties with NATO	bombing by Russian planes	Russia’s actions	moving toward greater freedom
Invited President Putin	unprovoked, illegal, totally unacceptable, and dangerous	enjoy freedom from aggression	join in shared determination
offered new and unprecedented peace plan	Russia’s actions have now been condemned	understand what the threat is	to press ahead toward better relations
assurances of autonomy	blatant and illegal provocations	against our land and our people	guided by a set of clear principles
increasingly provocative set of actions	protect Georgia	our values that are under attack	insist on our territorial sovereignty
part of Georgia’s territory	values that define our nation	exercise our right to associate our future with the friends and partners we choose	will not accept incursions or illegal actions
			Russia and her leaders must make their own choices

April 29, 2008	May 19, 2008		May 26, 2008
“Saakashvili Calls on Abkhazians, Ossetians to Jointly Resist External Force” <i>Civil.ge</i>	“INTERVIEW: Georgia's Saakashvili-Russia has aggressive intent” <i>Deutsche Press</i>		“UN Says Russia Downed Georgian Plane, Risking Peace” <i>Bloomberg</i>
Georgia is offering you peace	not as dramatic as two weeks ago	we should be crazy to consider a military option	openly and clearly pointed out
extending the hand of friendship	still very tense	very unclear period	it was the Russian Federation that shot down the drone
my brothers and sisters	they will conduct military actions	that this is unacceptable	further aggression by Russia
one aggressive force	will counteract NATO in the proximity of our (Russian) borders	contrary to international law	
it can take decisions instead of you	which has nothing to do with peacekeeping	There was ethnic cleansing	
Living under the reign of the separatists	against the wishes of Georgia	very unconventional thing to do	
criminal and corrupt groups	(against) any kind of peacekeeping agreement	not something that started happening yesterday	
large and outrageous force	We loudly objected	a long-standing kind of (Russian) policy	
It doesn't care what you think	are threats of direct action	try to solve this conflict peacefully	
make choices on your behalf	dangerous threats	We have decided not to give back Abkhazia'	
force us to continue existing in confrontation	very volatile situation	Because that is basically called appeasement	
it has imposed on us	extremely unstable		
outrageous and irresponsible force	Georgia is being a moderating force		
Georgia is offering you calm and protection			
Georgia is offering you life without gangs			
our common ill-wisher			
tries to impose on us its wicked plans			

June 6, 2008	July 10, 2008	July 11, 2008	
“Saakashvili outlines Terms Ahead of Talks with Medvedev” <i>Civil.ge</i>	“Russian intimidation at new level: Georgian leader” <i>Reuters UK</i>	“Sec. Rice With Georgian Pres. Mikheil Saakashvili” <i>Scoop.nz</i>	
extend the hand of friendship to Russia	don't recall anything as wild as this	our peace plan for the conflicts	that's what we are
conditions are very clear	for whom international law doesn't mean anything any more	country that also sets example	blatant besiege mentality
illegally deployed	bomb neighboring countries at will	Georgia's territorial integrity	have political dialogue at every level
immediately cease	whenever they want to	yesterday's incident	elephant is the actions of the Russian Federation
illegal April 16 decree	for God knows what reason	normal air forces don't do these kind of things	stopping to recognize borders
immediately rescinded	we cannot fight with Russia	very worrisome development	not done by very good governments
totally destroying	use all international diplomatic and political tools	Russia no longer supports	don't need repetition of bad cases of the past
Georgia is open	Russia keeps surprising	but are unprecedented	certainly reach out to every community
imposed on us		the most blatant challenge	this is about morality
		Looks like some people have not noticed that the Cold War is over	We want to have peace
		they were bombing us	we are willing to work very closely with Russia
		We want to find equitable solutions	we have very strong ties with Russia
		we need peaceful solutions	strong emotional, culture and historic ties
		we believe in strong multicultural, multiethnic democracy	we are a small country
			democracies are peaceful

July 12, 2008	July 15, 2008
<p>“Georgia urges more pressure on Russia” <i>Financial Times</i></p>	<p>“Russia is a menace to peace, says Georgia leader” <i>The London Times</i></p>
Georgia alone cannot stop this	situation is precarious
stronger reaction is needed from Europe	things they (Russia) are doing are outrageous
should be raised to the highest level in Europe and Washington	killing international law
	every day we are waking up with some surprises
	then it does get worse

Russian Rhetoric

February 21, 2008	February 14, 2008		March 8, 2008
Beginning of Meeting with President of Georgia (Joint Event) <i>Kremlin Transcript Archive</i>	“Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference” <i>Kremlin Transcript Archive</i>		“Press Conference following Talks with Germany’s Angela Merkel” <i>Kremlin Transcript Archive</i>
thank you for accepting our invitation	We always meet with Mikhail Nikolaievich	apply double standards	the endless expansion of a military and political bloc
our relations are starting to improve	any time that is convenient	same issue in different parts of the world	not only unnecessary but also harmful and counterproductive
Georgian leadership seeks better relations with Russia	And if he accepts our invitation	We are always being told	The impression is that
we are very pleased to hear this	of course we will meet with him	This is all lies	hardly likely to agree to such a structure
We will do our best	We never shy away from discussing sensitive issues	everyone knows this full well	potential for conflict
	As we will this time, of course	common set of principles for resolving such issues	and we will most certainly accept
	Are you Europeans not ashamed	We are proposing to our partners	
		Why should we encourage separatism?	

March 24, 2008	April 4, 2008	April 22, 2008	June 6, 2008
“Interview transcript: Dmitry Medvedev” <i>Financial Times</i>	“Press Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council” <i>Kremlin Transcript Archives</i>	“Putin to Saakashvili: Russia's Abkhazia- and South Ossetia-related acts are entirely in legal domain” <i>Regnum</i>	“Beginning of Meeting with President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili” <i>Kremlin Transcript Archives</i>
we are not happy about the situation	We complied in full	President of Russia expressed hope	we ourselves are capable of resolving
We consider that it is extremely troublesome	Treat us properly and we will respond accordingly	Georgian side would also take practical steps	overcoming the difficulties before us
no state can be pleased		inclusive protection of legal interests of Russia's citizens	building relations for the long term
military bloc to which it does not belong		alleviate social burden and ensure economic development	What do you think
coming close to its borders		continue work aimed at giving a positive impetus	
		entirely in the legal domain	

June 21, 2008			
“Excerpt from Transcript of Meeting with Students and Graduates of the St Petersburg State University Law Faculty” <i>Kremlin Transcript Archives</i>			
Russia is a peace-loving country	there can be no question	talks involving Georgia, Russia and the appropriate representatives of the territories	we will not allow such behaviour towards Russian peacekeepers
Georgia, like Russia	Georgia is a country very close to us	This is just what we will do	of course
We are bound by	differences of opinion between us	despite all the difficulties we face today	in accordance with an international agreement
common historical, cultural and state ties	things that we need to settle	we agreed that we will continue our contacts	carrying out their mission worthily and responsibly
our relations may not be living through the best of times	through bilateral negotiations	We will meet and discuss	not reason to draw the kinds of conclusions you suggested

CURRICULUM VITAE

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